Expanding the Non-Transactional Revolution: A New Approach to Securities Registration Exemptions by Bradford, C. Steven
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
College of Law, Faculty Publications Law, College of 
2000 
Expanding the Non-Transactional Revolution: A New Approach to 
Securities Registration Exemptions 
C. Steven Bradford 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, sbradford1@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub 
 Part of the Legal Studies Commons 
Bradford, C. Steven, "Expanding the Non-Transactional Revolution: A New Approach to Securities 
Registration Exemptions" (2000). College of Law, Faculty Publications. 70. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub/70 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Law, Faculty Publications by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Volume 49 SPRING 2000 Number 2
ARTICLES
EXPANDING THE NON-TRANSACTIONAL REVOLUTION: A
NEW APPROACH TO SECURITIES REGISTRATION
EXEMPTIONS
C. Steven Bradford*
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 439
I. THE TRANSACTIONAL NATURE OF THE
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT ............................................................. 442
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EXEMPTIONS ..................... 448
A. Small Offering Exemptions ......................... 448
B. Sophisticated Offeree Exemptions ................................................ 451
C. Deference Exemptions .................................................................. 452
D. The Intrastate Offering Exemption ............................................... 453
m. THE TRANSACTIONAL BASIS OF EXEMPTIONS FROM
THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT ...................................................... 455
A. Resale Restrictions ....................................................................... 456
1. Introduction to the Underwriter Concept
and Limits on Resales ............................................................. 456
2. Liberalization: Easing the Transactional
Lim its on Resales .................................................................... 458
B. The Integration Doctrine .............................................................. 460
1. An Introduction to the Integration Doctrine ........................... 460
2. Liberalization: Changes to the Integration Doctrine ............. 464
* Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of
Law. This Article was funded in part by a Ross McCollum Summer Research Grant. My thanks to Jessica
Feller, University of Nebraska College of Law Class of 1998, and to Colleen Timm, University of Nebraska
College of Law Class of 2001, for their research assistance on this Article.
Copyright 2000, Emory Law School. Used by permission.
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
IV. THE DILEMMA POSED BY THE CURRENT SYSTEM ................................ 467
A. The Problem with the Integration Doctrine ................................. 468
B. The Safe Harbors as an Incomplete Solution ............................... 470
C. The Problem with Abolishing the Integration
Doctrine Entirely .......................................................................... 472
V. RESOLVING THE DILEMMA: A WEIGHTED
EXEMPTION SYSTEM ............................................................................ 473
A. Using Multiple Small Offering Exemptions .................................. 474
B. Dealing with the Sophisticated Offeree and
Deference Exemptions .................................................................. 478
1. Sophisticated Offeree Exemptions .......................................... 479
2. Deference Exemptions ............................................................ 480
VI. POTENTL4AL PROBLEMS WITH THE WEIGHTED
EXEMPTION APPROACH ........................................................................ 480
A. Restrictions on Solicitation ........................................................... 481
B. Restrictions on Resale .................................................................. 483
C. Limits on the Number of Purchasers ............................................ 484
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 485
[Vol. 49
EXPANDING THE NON-TRANSACTIONAL REVOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
Federal securities law is in the midst of a revolution. Since 1933, the
registration of securities offerings under the Securities Act of 19331 (the
"Securities Act") and the exemptions from the registration requirement have
rested on the elusive metaphysical, almost mystical, concept of "transaction."
Offers and sales of securities are grouped into discrete transactions known as
offerings or issues, and the provisions of the Securities Act apply to those
offerings collectively. Application of the registration requirement, the
exemptions from the registration requirement, and resale restrictions depend on
the characteristics not of individual offers and sales but of the offering as a
whole. The transactional system has three foundational elements: (1) current
registration of discrete offerings-the idea that an issuer may register only
discrete offerings of securities planned to be sold in the immediate future; (2)
resale restrictions arising out of the underwriter concept-the idea that
securities acquired in an exempted offering are not freely resalable; and (3) the
integration doctrine-the idea that an entire offering, not individual offers and
sales, must qualify for a single exemption from registration.2
That transactional foundation is crumbling rapidly. Unfortunately, the
changes have not been uniform across all three elements of the system. The
parts of the system most important to small businesses have changed the least,
leaving them at a competitive disadvantage.
With respect to registration, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") has dramatically expanded its shelf registration rule, allowing more
securities to be registered and then sold from time to time as needed rather than
in an immediate, one-time transaction.3 In 1996, the Advisory Committee on
the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes, chaired by then-Commis-
sioner Steven Wallman, issued a report recommending that the transactional
basis of Securities Act registration be virtually eliminated for some issuers and
weakened for others. The SEC responded with a rules proposal, known as the
"Aircraft Carrier" because of its size, that does not fully accept the Advisory
1 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1994).
2 Antifraud liability under the federal securities law is also fundamentally transaction-based. See
Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 567
(1997).
3 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1999).
4 See Securities& Exchange Comm'n, Report oftheAdvisory Committee on the Capital Formation and
Regulatory Processes (last modified July 24, 1996) <http:lwww.sec.govlnewslstudieslcapform.htrn> ("Ad-
visory Committiee Report"); see also infra text accompanying notes 26-41.
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Committee's recommendations, but nevertheless eliminates some of the
burdens of the current transactional registration system, particularly for larger
companies.
5
Similar changes have been made to the restrictions on resale. In 1972, the
SEC adopted a resale safe harbor, Rule 144, that made resale restrictions more
6
certain. The SEC has gradually liberalized Rule 144 over the years to weaken
the tie between resales and the transaction in which the securities were
originally offered.7  In 1990, the SEC adopted the Rule 144A resale safe
harbor, which seems to cast aside the transaction idea altogether.
8
The third element of the transactional system-exemptions from regis-
tration-hinges on the integration doctrine, which is used by the SEC to
determine which offers and sales of securities fall within a single transaction.
9
The changes to the integration doctrine have been less drastic than in the other
two areas. The SEC has added safe harbors to protect particular exemptions
against integration, 10 but there is no unified, broadly applicable integration safe
harbor equivalent to the Rule 144 resale safe harbor. Neither the SEC nor any
group affiliated with the SEC has proposed broad deviations from the
transaction concept similar to those contained in Rule 144A or the Advisory
Committee's proposals. An internal Task Force on Disclosure Simplification
appointed by the SEC to examine the exemptions from registration proposed
only relatively minor modifications to the exemptions, not a frontal attack on
the transaction system itself."
This is unfortunate, because the exemptions from the registration require-
ment are the most important part of the Securities Act for small businesses.
Economies of scale make Securities Act registration disproportionately
5 The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 7606A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174 (1988)
(proposed Dec. 4, 1988) ("Aircraft Carrier"); see also infra text accompanying notes 45-54.
6 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(1999). See Definition of the Terms "Underwriter" and "Brokers' Transactions,"
Exchange Act Release No. 5223, 37 Fed. Reg. 591 (1972) (original adoption of Rule 144). See also infra text
accompanying notes 138-43.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 14448.
8 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1999). See Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining
Holding Period of Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Exchange Act Release No. 6862, 55 Fed.
Reg. 17,933 (1990) (adopting Rule 144A); see also infra text accompanying notes 149-54.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 155-82.
1o See infra text accompanying notes 183-91.
11 See Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Report of the Task Force on Disclosure Simplification (last
modified November 5, 1996) <http'/www.sec.gov/news/studies/smpl.htm> ("Task Force Report"); see also
infra text accompanying notes 192-97.
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burdensome for smaller offerings and cost-effective only for larger public
companies. 12  Yet, the greatest liberalization of the transaction concept is
taking place in the registration system, not the exemptions. The transaction
restriction has changed the least in the exemptions from registration, which
benefit small businesses the most.13 Although the integration doctrine affects
both large and small issuers, "the tangles and snares of the doctrine generally
are less troublesome to larger issuers," who have a variety of financing
alternatives.14 The capital needs of smaller, emerging businesses are difficult
to predict, leading to multiple rounds of financing that are more likely to
ensnare them in the integration doctrine.15 As a result, the benefits of the non-
transactional revolution have been unfairly skewed in favor of larger issuers.
The transactional basis of the exemptions from registration stands virtually
intact because no one has been able to resolve a fundamental dilemma. On one
hand, the integration doctrine protects the policy bases of the registration
exemptions. Abolishing the integration doctrine entirely would allow issuers
to manipulate the system. If an issuer could split its offering among several
different exemptions, offerings that should be registered might escape
registration. On the other hand, the integration doctrine is costly and confusing
to issuers using the transaction exemptions. Some offerings that do not fit
within a single exemption nevertheless should be exempted. The SEC has
been unable to resolve the dilemma-to find a way to protect the policy bases
of the exemptions while accommodating the needs of small business issuers.
As a result, the SEC has resorted to partial, Band-Aid fixes-individual
integration safe harbors that alleviate some of the more egregious problems
without resolving the basic dilemma.
It is time to rethink the entire transactional basis of the exemption system,
much as the Advisory Committee rethought the transactional basis of the
registration system. In this Article, I propose a weighted exemption system
12 For a discussion of the economies of scale in registration, see C. Steven Bradford, Transaction
Exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933: An Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY LJ. 591,614-16 (1996).
13 The liberalization of the resale restrictions applies to large and small companies alike. However, Rule
144A, the greatest challenge to the transaction concept in the resale area, is more likely to be used by larger
companies because the qualified institutional buyers who are exempted by Rule 144A are less likely to buy the
securities of small issuers. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Love and Money: An Affinity-Based Model for the
Regulation of Capital Formation by Small Businesses, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 259, 262 (1998)
(noting that in many cases, investors in small businesses are relatives or friends of the promoters).
14 Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers (and Others) Under Regulation D: Those
Nagging Problems That Need Attention, 74 KY. L.. 127, 162-63 (1985-86).
15 See Lyman Johnson & Steve Patterson, The Reincarnation of Rule 152: False Hope on the Integration
Front, 46 WASH. & L E L. REv. 539, 540 (1989).
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that eliminates the transaction concept entirely, allowing an issuer to use more
than one exemption for a single offering while preserving the integrity of the
registration requirement and the policy bases of the exemptions. Under the
proposed weighted exemption system, issuers could mix and match
exemptions as they wish, subject to an overall dollar amount cap. To deter-
mine whether that cap has been met, the amount of securities sold using each
exemption would be weighted in proportion to the amount of investor
protection provided by that exemption.
I begin in Part I with a brief discussion of the transactional nature of the
registration requirement. Part II introduces the various exemptions from
registration and sketches their policy justifications. Part m discusses the
transactional basis of the exemptions and the two doctrines that support that
transactional system-restrictions on resale and the integration doctrine. In
Part IV, I discuss the weaknesses of the integration doctrine and the dilemma
the transactional system of exemptions presents. Part V presents my weighted
exemption proposal, and Part VI discusses some potential problems with the
weighted exemption proposal and their solutions.
No fundamental changes to the exemptions or to the SEC's philosophy of
investor protection are required to implement a weighted exemption system. I
will, therefore, take the existing exemptions as a given. My proposal can
easily accommodate either the current exemptions or any amendments to those
exemptions, with one possible exception-the restrictions on general solic-
itation in Regulation D.
I. THE TRANSACTIONAL NATURE OF THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT
The Securities Act registration requirement is transactional in two senses.
First, issuers must register an entire offering of securities; they cannot register
part of an offering and seek an exemption for the other part. This is an aspect
of the integration doctrine, to be discussed later. 16 Second, issuers may register
only a single, discrete, identifiable offering. Except as discussed below, an
issuer may not file a single registration statement and sell securities at various
times as needed. The final sentence of section 6(a) of the Securities Act
provides that "[a] registration statement shall be deemed effective only as to
the securities specified therein as proposed to be offered."'17 The SEC has long
16 See infra Part III.B.
17 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1994).
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interpreted this sentence to mean that an issuer may register only securities that
it presently intends to offer for sale.18  According to the SEC, "Congress
contemplated that registration should be effective only in connection with
offerings proposed to be made in the proximate future."'19 Furthermore, a
Securities Act registration is effective only for the securities identified in the
registration statement. If the issuer indicates in the registration statement that
it intends to sell 100,000 shares of common stock and decides a month after
that registration statement becomes effective to sell an additional 50,000
shares, a new registration is required.
20
Despite the SEC interpretation of section 6(a), the SEC always has allowed
some types of shelf registration-current registration of securities to be sold
"off the shelf' at some indefinite time in the future.21  In 1982, the SEC
formalized and expanded its shelf registration policies in Securities Act Rule
415.22 Rule 415 codified the traditional situations in which the SEC had
allowed shelf registration,2 3 but also added a significant new exception for
certain public issuers.24 Companies that qualify to use Rule 415 may register
securities they plan to offer on a continuous or delayed basis over a period of
up to two years.
18 See United Combustion Corp., 3 S.E.C. 1062, 1063 (1938); Shawnee Chiles Syndicate, 10 S.E.C. 109,
113 (1941).
19 Shawnee Chiles Syndicate, 10 S.E.C. at 113.
20 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.413 (1999).
21 See Guides for the Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, Exchange Act Release No. 4936,
33 Fed. Reg. 18,617, 18,618 (1968), rescinded in Rescission of Guides and Redesignation of Industry Guides,
Exchange Act Release No. 6384,47 Fed. Reg. 11,476 (1982); Scott Hodes, Shelf Registration: The Dilemma
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 VA. L. Rav. 1106, 1115-46 (1963); John Paul Ketels, SEC
Rule 415: The New Experimental Procedures for Shelf Registration, 10 SEc. REG. LJ. 318, 323 (1983).
22 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1999). Rule 415 was adopted in March 1982 as a temporary rule effective until
December 10, 1982. Its effective date was later extended to December 31, 1983, and a revised, permanent rule
was adopted on November 10, 1983. See Francis J. Feeney, Jr., The Saga of Rule 415: Registration for the
Shelf, 9 CORP. L REv. 41, 44-47 (1986). For a more detailed discussion of the costs and benefits of Rule 415,
see generally Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: An
Analysis of Rule 415,70 VA. L. REv. 135 (1984).
2' 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(1)(i)-(ix) (1999); see also Feeney, supra note 22, at 42-44 (discussing shelf
registration prior to Rule 415).
24 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(1)(x).
2' See id § 230.415(a)(2).
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In February 1995, the SEC chartered the Advisory Committee on the
Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes, chaired by then-SEC Com-
missioner Steven Wallman but otherwise consisting of outsiders." The
Advisory Committee's mission was
to assist the Commission in evaluating the efficiency and
effectiveness of the regulatory process and the disclosure
requirements relating to public offerings of securities, secondary
market trading and corporate reporting, and in identifying and
developing means to minimize costs imposed by current regulatory
programs, from the perspective of investors, issuers, the various
market participants, and other interested persons and regulatory
authorities.
27
The Advisory Committee issued its report in July 1996.28 The Committee
noted the "increasingly complex, but often ineffective, series of regulations
and concepts fashioned over the years to preserve" the transactional
registration requirements, and proposed a company registration system that
would almost fully integrate the periodic reporting requirements of the
Exchange Act and the registration of offerings under the Securities Act.30 The
focus of the company registration system proposed by the Advisory Committee
would be ongoing disclosure by issuers, rather than the occasional,
transactional disclosure currently required by the Securities Act at the time of
an offering. Continuous disclosure, not tied to any particular offering, would
26 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 4, at 136-37. The Advisory Committee was originally
chartered for one year, but its charter was extended for an additional seven months to allow it to complete its
work. Id. at 138-39.
27 Id.
2 Id. at 1.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 22-29. The Advisory Committee proposed that certain non-routine and extraordinary
transactions be treated differently. Id. at 25-26. Those special procedures are not discussed in the text.
The Advisory Committee's proposal was not the first company registration proposal. In 1966, Milton
Cohen proposed a coordinated disclosure system focusing on the registration of companies. Milton H. Cohen,
"Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 H.Iv. L. REv. 1340, 1366-1406 (1966). The American Law Institute's
Federal Securities Code, proposed in 1980, similarly emphasized the registration of companies and de-
emphasized the registration of particular offerings of securities. FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (1980). The
introduction to the Code indicated that "[u]nder the Code there will be no more registration of securities." Id.
at introduction. Under the Federal Securities Code, a company would have been required to register when (1)
it had $1 million or more in assets and 500 or more securities holders, id. § 402; (2) when it made the first
public distribution of its securities, id. §§ 403, 202(41); or (3) if any of its securities was traded on a national
securities exchange, id. § 902(a)(1). An offering statement would still have been required for any distribution
of securities. Id. § 502.
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in essence provide an "umbrella" of disclosure under which offers and sales of
securities could be made from time to time as needed.
Under the Advisory Committee's proposal, eligible companies would file a
single Form C-1 registration statement disclosing their plan to sell securities
31from time to time in the future. Companies would continue to file Exchange
Act reports periodically as under the current system.32 In most cases an issuer
could sell its securities as needed with no additional SEC staff review.33 The
primary source of investor information would be the company's ongoing
Exchange Act disclosure file, and, at the time of the sales, the issuer would
have to file only material information concerning the specific offering and any
material updates to the Exchange Act information already on file.3 4  In
"routine" transactions, the issuer would not even be required to deliver a
formal prospectus to investors.
35
The Advisory Committee's proposals focused on reporting, public
companies rather than on small businesses.36  The Advisory Committee
concluded that the existing Securities Act structure was "well-suited for
companies that are engaging in an initial public offering. 37 It left issues
involving non-reporting companies and their use of the transaction exemptions
to the SEC's Task Force on Disclosure Simplification.38
The Advisory Committee saw its company registration proposals as a
virtual panacea. Issuers would see the benefits of company registration and
31 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 4, at 22.
32 id.
33 id.
34 Id. at 22-23.
35 ld. at 23-25. The Advisory Committee proposed three tiers of prospectus delivery requirements.
Routine transactions (any offering not involving the sale of voting equity amounting to 20 percent or more of
the issuer's existing public float) would be exempt. Id. at 23-25. The Committee indicated that 70 percent of
all firm commitment common equity offerings in 1992-94 would have been routine. Id. at 24 n.23.
Prospectuses would have to be delivered to non-accredited investors in "non-routine" transactions-offerings
of voting equity amounting to 20 percent or more of the existing public float. Id. at 25. In "extraordinary"
transactions-offerings of voting equity amounting to 40 percent or more of the existing public float-
prospectuses would have to be delivered to non-accredited investors and the prospectus could not be used until
after SEC review. Id. at 25-26.
36 Id. at 8. The pilot company registration project proposed by the Advisory Committee is even more
limited. The Committee proposed that participation initially be limited to companies with a $75 million public
float, two years of reporting under the Exchange Act, and a class of securities listed on a national securities
exchange or traded on the NASDAQ National Market System. Id. at 28.
37 Id. at 8.38 See id. at 11.
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would choose to register rather than use the exemptions. 39  Once company
registration was extended to smaller issuers, the problems the current
transactional system causes small issuers would be resolved. 4 In fact, the
Advisory Committee toyed with the idea of eliminating the transaction
exemptions entirely.41
On July 25, 1996, the day after the release of the Advisory Committee
report, the SEC issued a concept release seeking comment on the Advisory
Committee's company registration proposal, as well as certain other disclosure
issues.42  The SEC received 55 comment letters responding to this release, 43
and late in 1998, it published its Aircraft Carrier rules proposal.44
The Aircraft Carrier did not fully adopt the Advisory Committee's
company registration proposals, nor did it propose to eliminate the
transactional basis of registration. In fact, the Aircraft Carrier proposals in
some ways reemphasize the transactional focus of the existing system. 5 The
Aircraft Carrier does, however, propose a couple of steps in the direction of
company registration.4 6  First, the proposals would allow some public
companies to incorporate into their Securities Act registration statements some
or all of the information in their Exchange Act periodic reports.47  Some
incorporation by reference has been allowed since the SEC's 1982 "integrated
39 See id. According to the Advisory Committee:
The benefits resulting from registration, including the issuance of freely tradable securities in what
otherwise would have been a private transaction resulting in restricted securities, should outweigh
any additional costs imposed by registering the securities under the system. lliquidity discounts
typically imposed by the market on non-registered securities should be eliminated for all securities
issued under the company registration system. ... Also, issuers would ultimately benefit by the
reduction or elimination of the costs and uncertainties that today result from complex interpretive
concepts and the concomitant need to monitor transactions in restricted securities.
Id. at 29.
40 See id. at 56.
41 Id. at 100-02.
42 Securities Act Concepts and Their Effects on Capital Formation, Exchange Act Release No. 7314, 61
Fed. Reg. 40,044 (1996).
43 Aircraft Carrier, supra note 5, at 67,180.
44 See id The Aircraft Carrier fills more than 150 pages in the Federal Register and includes more than
650 footnotes. A full review of the Aircraft Carrier proposals is beyond the scope of this Article. For a good
overview of the Aircraft Carrier proposals, see Special Issue: The Aircraft Carrier Release, INsIGTs, Jan.
1999, at 2.
45 See Linda C. Quinn & Ottilie L. Jarmel, SEC Communications Initiative: Welcome Reform or
Regulatory Retrenchment?, INSIGHTS, Jan. 1999, at 15.
46 For a more detailed explanation, see Mark S. Bergman, Proposed Reforms to the Securities Act
Registration System, INSiG-rs, Jan. 1999, at 4.
47 Aircraft Carrier, supra note 5, at 67,181-83; 67,195-96.
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disclosure" initiative,48 but the Aircraft Carrier proposals would liberalize
those incorporation-by-reference rules, further severing the tie between the
disclosure requirements and the particular offering.49 Second, the Aircraft
Carrier proposes to allow some public companies, particularly larger issuers, to
begin selling securities immediately upon filing the registration statement
50
With these two changes, the registration system would begin to approach the
umbrella disclosure, sell-at-any-time system contemplated by the Advisory
Committee.
The Aircraft Carrier also contains a number of proposals that liberalize the
current system's restrictions on communications. Large public companies
would be freed of almost all restrictions on communication prior to and during
a registered offering.52 The section 5 restrictions on communications prior to
filing a registration statement would be liberalized for other companies, and
most of the post-filing restrictions would be eliminated. 53  These com-
munications proposals also move away from a strictly transactional view of
registered offerings. Under the current system, what an issuer may say
depends on whether the issuer is "in registration"--in other words, whether the
issuer is engaged in an offering transaction. 54  Communications that would
normally be acceptable are prohibited once an offering is in progress. Under
the Aircraft Carrier communication proposals, the line between offering and
non-offering would be less important to issuers, particularly large public
issuers.
48 Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Exchange Act Release No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380
(Mar. 16, 1982).
49 Aircraft Carrier, supra note 5, at 67,181-83; 67,195-96.
50 Aircraft Carrier, supra note 5, at 67,184; 67,196-97; see also Marilyn Mooney & Gillian McPhee,
Aircraft Carrier Proposals Change the Timing of the Registered Offering Process, INsiGHTS, Jan. 1999, at 9.
51 For a more detailed overview of the Aircraft Carrier's communications proposals, see generally Quinn
& Jarmel, supra note 45.
52 Registrants using a Form B registration statement could communicate freely both prior to and after
filing the registration statement. Aircraft Carrier, supra note 5, at 67,210-12; 67,214-16. An issuer would be
eligible to use Form B if either (1) its "public float"(the aggregate market value of its common equity
securities held by non-affiiates) is $75 million or more and the average daily trading volume of its equity
securities is $1 million or more; or (2) its public float is $250 million or more Aircraft Carrier, supra note 5,
at 67,185.
53 Aircraft Carrier, supra note 5, at 67,212-16.
54 See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 3844, 1 Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) H 3250-56 (Oct. 8, 1957).
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II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EXEMPTIONS
The registration requirement in the Securities Act is not absolute; there are
exemptions, and most of the exemptions are also transactional.55 The most
important transaction exemptions available to issuers can be classified into
three categories based on the economic justification for the exemption: (1)
small offering exemptions, for offerings of a limited dollar amount; (2)
sophisticated offeree exemptions, for offerings to purchasers able to fend for
themselves without the protection of registration; and (3) deference
56
exemptions, for offerings regulated by some entity other than the SEC. One
of the Securities Act exemptions, the intrastate offering exemption, is difficult
to categorize along these lines, so it is discussed separately.
A. Small Offering Exemptions
The small offering exemptions limit the total dollar amount of securities
sold in the offering. The principal small offering exemptions are Regulation
A57 and Rules 5048 and 50559 of Regulation D. The economic rationale for
the small offering exemptions is based on economies of scale in registration.
60
Because of relatively large fixed costs, the cost to register a small offering
exceeds the benefits associated with registration. Only when the size of the
55 Not all of the exemptions in the Securities Act are transactional. Some securities are permanently
exempt from registration under the exemptions. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2)-(8) (1994 & Supp. 1995). Because
of the nature of the issuer or the character of the security, these securities are permanently exempted from
registration no matter how they are distributed or sold. In other words, the type of transaction does not alter
their status as exempt securities. See 7 J. WI.LtAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANsACrIONs UNDER THE SECURITIES
Acr OF 1933, at 1-19 (1999 rev.); see also JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECtUrIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 547 (1991) (summarizing various rationales for securities exemptions).
56 For a more complete discussion of the economic rationales for the three types of exemptions discussed
in the text, see Bradford, supra note 12, at 609-35. This Article focuses on the major exemptions available to
issuers raising new capital. Exemptions available for employee benefit plans are beyond the scope of this
Article. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (1999); see also Robert B. Robbins, Securities Offerings to Employees,
Consultants, and Advisers Under Rule 701, 31 REv. SEC. & COMMOD. REG. 51 (1998). The bankruptcy
exemptions, some of which appear in the Bankruptcy Code rather than in the Securities Act, are also beyond
the scope of this Article. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(0, 1145(a) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(7) (1994); see also 3
Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 1229-30, 1287-93 (3d ed. 1999); Richard J. Morgan,
Application of the Securities Laws in Chapter 11 Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
1983 U. ILL. L REv. 861.
57 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251 to 230.263 (1999).
58 Id. § 230.504.
59 Id. § 230.505.
60 For a more complete discussion of this theory, see Bradford, supra note 12, at 614-18.
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offering is larger does the benefit of registration justify its cost.61 Of course,
the fact that full registration of smaller offerings is not economically justified
does not mean that investor protection is unjustified. Intermediate disclosure
rules that do not provide the full benefit of registration, but also have lower
compliance costs, could be economically efficient for all but the smallest
offerings. An incremental system in which the level of investor protection
increases as the size of the offering increases62 could make sense. To some
extent, this describes our current system.
Rule 504 of Regulation D,63 which exempts offerings with an aggregate
offering price of $1 million or less, 64 is the least burdensome small offering
exemption. Until 1999, Rule 504 offered a virtually unrestricted federal
exemption: general solicitation and advertising were allowed, no information
had to be provided to investors, the number of offerees and purchasers was
unlimited, and Rule 504 securities were freely resalable.65 In 1999, the SEC
amended Rule 504: except for state-registered offerings and certain state-
exempted offerings to accredited investors, 66  general solicitation and
advertising are now prohibited and resales are restricted.67  In spite of these
additional restrictions, Rule 504 remains the least restrictive small offering
exemption.
61 See Bradford, supra note 12, at 614-18. Registration involves a relatively large fixed cost, whereas the
gains from registration are roughly proportionate to the size of the offering. As a result, the total cost and total
benefit of registration look something like the curves in Figure 1. The total benefit of registration exceeds the
total cost (in other words, registration produces a net benefit) only when the offering exceeds some minimal
amount; offerings of less than that amount should be exempted.
Figure 1
-~ _________Total Beet
......... Total
S Amount of Offering
62 Or, to put it another way, the level of exemption decreases as the size of the offering increases.
63 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1999).
64 lId § 230.504(b)(2). Prior to 1992, Rule 504 provided for a $1 million limit, but no more than
$500,000 of the securities sold could be sold without state registration. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2)(i) (1990)
(superseded). The 1992 amendments provided for a single $1 million exemption, regardless of whether the
offering was registered in a state. See Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6949, 57 Fed.
Reg. 36,442 (1992).
65 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1998) (superseded).
66 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (1999).
67 Id. §§ 230.504(b)(1), 230.502(c)-(d).
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Rule 50568 is the second least burdensome small offering exemption. It has
a $5 million offering amount limit,69 but the issuer may sell to no more than
thirty-five non-accredited purchasers, plus an unlimited number of accredited
investors.70 General solicitation of investors and general advertising are
prohibited,71 and resales are restricted. 72  The issuer must furnish to non-
accredited investors information about the issuer, its business, and the
73securities being offered. Finally, the issuer must provide purchasers with an
opportunity to ask questions and obtain any additional information "which the
issuer possesses or can acquire without unreasonable effort or expense" to
verify the accuracy of the information required to be furnished. 74
Regulation A7 is the most burdensome small offering exemption.
Regulation A exempts offerings with an aggregate offering price of $5 million
or less, 76 but it requires issuers to comply with what has been called a "mini-
registration," 77 a "less expensive and time consuming" version of the statutory
filing and prospectus delivery requirements. 78  The issuer must file with the
SEC a disclosure document known as an offering statement79 and must provide
investors with a prospectus-like document known as an offering circular.
80
68 Id. § 230.505.
69 See id. § 230.505(b)(2)(i).
70 See id. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), 230.501(e)(1)(iv).
71 See id. § 230.502(c).
72 See id. § 230.502(d).
73 See id. § 230.502(b)(1). The amount of information required depends on the size of the offering and
whether the issuer is a reporting company under the Exchange Act. See id. § 230.502(b)(2). At least some
audited financial statements are required in all cases. See id. § 230.502(b)(2). Regulation D does not require
that any information be provided to accredited investors. Id. § 230.502(b)(1). The issuer must also inform
non-accredited investors about any additional information that was provided to any accredited investors, and
give them access to that information upon request. See id. § 230.502(b)(2)(iv).
74 Id. § 230.502(b)(2)(v).
75 Id. §§ 230.251-230.263.
76 Id. § 230.251(b). The limit is $5 million per 12-month period. The SEC's Task Force on Disclosure
Simplification has proposed to change the dollar amount in Regulation A from $5 million per 12-month period
to $5 million per 6-month period, effectively doubling the Regulation A limit. Task Force Report, supra note
11, at 65-66. Alternatively, the Task Force proposed to make the limit $5 million per offering to allow
multiple $5 million offerings in a single 12-month period. Id at 66. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying
text.
77 7A HICKs, supra note 55, at 6-19.71 Id. at 67.
79 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.252 (1999). This offering statement is filed on Form 1-A. See Form 1-A, 2 Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) U 7325-7325C (1993). Regulation A contains a "test-the-waters" provision allowing
issuers to solicit potential investors prior to filing the offering statemen see 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (1999), but
offers to sell prior to filing Form 1-A are otherwise prohibited, see id. § 230.251(d)(1)(i).
So See id. § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(B), (C).
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The offering circular includes the same narrative and financial information as
the filed offering statement.
B. Sophisticated Offeree Exemptions
The sophisticated offeree exemptions limit the types of buyers to whom the
issuer may sell, and in some cases even offer, its securities. The economic
rationale for the sophisticated offeree exemptions is that certain offerees,
because of sophistication, bargaining power, or access to information about the
issuer, do not sufficiently benefit from the additional protection registration
provides. 8 The main sophisticated offeree exemptions are section 4(2) of the
Securities Act 82 and its safe harbor, Rule 506 of Regulation D, 83 and the SEC's
newest transaction exemption, Regulation CE 4
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts "transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering.' ' 5 The dollar amount of a section 4(2) private
offering is unlimited.86  Although the legislative history of section 4(2)
provides little guidance,87 the Supreme Court has held that section 4(2) was
meant to exempt offerings to "those who are shown to be able to fend for
themselves" or those such as "executive personnel who because of their
81 For a more detailed discussion, see Bradford, supra note 12, at 624-27. For an argument that at least
some of the categories of investors who may purchase in these sophisticated offeree exemptions do need
additional protection, see Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae
in Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291 (1994).
82 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2) (1994).
83 Section 4(6) of the Securities Act, id. § 77(d)(6), also exempts offerings to accredited investors, but
Rule 506 is available in almost every case in which section 4(6) would be available and Rule 506 is generally
less restrictive, so section 4(6) "is of little, if any, use today." Cox, supra note 55, at 433; see also 3A
HAROLD S. BLOOmETH & SAMUEL WOLFF, 3A SECtURIMES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 3:23, at 3-44
(1997) (stating that the Section 4(6) exemption is 'largely redundant").
Section 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act also might be classified as a sophisticated offeree exemption. It
exempts "any security exchanged by the issuer with its existing security holders exclusively where no
commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting such exchange." 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1994). The rationale for section 3(a)(9) is in part based on the notion that the issuer's
existing security holders already have some knowledge about the company. They may have already received
information about the transaction if shareholder approval for the issuance was required. In any event, the
security holders are not investing additional money, but merely changing the form of their investment in an
issuer about which they are presumably already informed. See 7 HICKS, supra note 55, at 2-126 to 2-133.
84 17 C.F.R. § 230.1001 (1999).
85 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994).
86 See id.
87 See 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 56, at 1362-63.
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position have access to the same kind of information that the Act would make
available in the form of a registration statement."
88
Rule 506 of Regulation D is a regulatory safe harbor for section 4(2).89 It
exempts sales of an unlimited dollar amount of securities to two classes of
investors: (1) up to thirty-five purchasers each of whom "either alone or with
his purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial
and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the
prospective investment; ' 90  and (2) an unlimited number of "accredited
investors." 91 The term "accredited investor" is defined to include institutional
investors, wealthy individuals, and directors, executive officers, and partners of
the issuer.92 Rule 506 has the same information requirements as Rule 50593
and similarly restricts solicitation94 and resales. 95
The most recent sophisticated offeree exemption is Regulation CE.
9 6
Regulation CE exempts from federal registration offers and sales that satisfy
section 25102(n) of the California Corporations Code, as long as the aggregate
offering price does not exceed $5 million.97  The California exemption is
similar to Rule 506, limiting sales to "qualified purchasers"98 and providing for
Regulation D disclosure to some purchasers.99 However, unlike Rule 506, the
California exemption allows limited solicitation of investors. In essence,
Regulation CE relaxes the general solicitation restriction applicable to Rule
506 offerings.
C. Deference Exemptions
Deference exemptions exempt offerings from registration when some other
agency or a court is already reviewing the offering. The economic rationale
88 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953).
89 Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and
Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389,47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,252 (1982).
90 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i), (ii) (1999).
9' Id. §§ 230.506(b)(2)(i), 230.501(e)(1)(iv).
92 Id. § 230.501(a).
93 Id. § 230.502(b)(2). See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
94 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1999).
95 Id. § 230.502(d).
96 Id. § 230.1001. See C. Steven Bradford, The SEC's New Regulation CE Exemption: Federal-State
Coordination Run Rampant, 52 U. MIAM L. REV. 429 (1998).
97 17 C.F.R. § 230.1001(b) (1999).
98 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(2) (West Supp. 2000). For a comprehensive listing of the categories of
investors qualifying as "qualified purchasers," see Bradford, supra note 96, at 454-59.
99 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(4).
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for the deference exemptions is based on comparative regulatory advantage:
Some regulator other than the SEC is already regulating the offering and, given
that alternative regulation, registration with the SEC would not produce a
positive net benefit.100
The primary deference exemption available outside of the bankruptcy
context is section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act.10 1 Section 3(a)(10) exempts
any security10 2 issued at least partly in exchange for other securities, claims or
property interests, where any court, federal agency, or state banking or
insurance commission approves the exchange after a hearing on its fairness.
0 3
The basis of this exemption is a belief that "the examination and approval by
the body in question of the fairness of the issue in question is a substitute for
the protection afforded to the investor by the information which would
otherwise be made available to him through registration.'
1 4
D. The Intrastate Offering Exemption
One other important exemption is difficult to categorize, primarily because
its economic justification is relatively weak. Section 3(a)(l1) of the Securities
Act'05 exempts purely intrastate offerings: "Any security which is part of an
issue offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State or
Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person resident and doing
business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business within,
such State or Territory."'1 6 Section 3(a)(11) imposes several requirements: (1)
all of the offerees must reside in the state; (2) the issuer must reside in the
state, or if it is a corporation, be incorporated in the state; (3) the issuer must
have substantial operations in the state; and (4) substantially all of the proceeds
of the offering must be used within the state. 107 Rule 147108 is a regulatory
100 For a more complete discussion of this theory, see Bradford, supra note 12, at 630-35.
101 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1994). In the bankruptcy context, section 1145(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 1145(a) (1994), conditioned on the review and approval of the sale by the bankruptcy court that
occurs during confirmation of a plan, clearly is a deference exemption. Section 364(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 364(f) (1994), closely related to the security exemption in section 3(a)(7) of the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(7) (1994), is also, at least in part, a deference exemption. See Bradford, supra note 12,
at 629-30 and authorities cited therein.
102 There is an exception for securities exchanged in a case under title 11 of the United States Code. 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1994).
103 Il § 77c(a)(10).
104 Securities Act Release No. 312, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) U 2171-2184, at 2591 (Mar. 15, 1935).
105 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1994).
'06 Id. § 77c(a)(l1).
107 See Securities Act Release No. 5450, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,617
2000]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
safe harbor for section 3(a)(11); it attempts to clarify the requirements for
exemption.1
°9
The legislative history of section 3(a)(11) is "sparse," 110 but two possible
rationales have been offered by the SEC.111 One rationale, which places the
exemption in the sophisticated offeree category, is that an intrastate offering
will involve local offerees familiar with the issuer who, because of their
proximity to and familiarity with the issuer, do not need the protection of
federal registration. This rationale is suspect: an investor in New York, for
example, cannot possibly be familiar with all New York companies.113  A
second rationale for section 3(a)(l1) is that, because of the local nature of the
offering, state regulation is adequate and federal regulation is not needed.
114
This rationale seems more plausible, although it is also subject to objections."15
Under this rationale, section 3(a)(1 1) is a deference exemption. In the rest of
this Article, I shall treat section 3(a)(11) and Rule 147 as deference
exemptions, although nothing proposed turns on that classification.
at 83,650-654 (Jan. 7, 1974), and cases cited therein. Rule 147 provides more specific guidance as to each of
these requirements. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1999).
108 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1999).
109 See Preliminary Notes accompanying id. § 230.147.
110 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 56, at 1295.
"I See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 5450, supra note 107, at 2611-12 ("In theory, the investors would
be protected both by their proximity to the issuer and by state regulation").
112 For example, the Task Force on Disclosure Simplification, suggesting that the exemption be available
to offerees employed but not residing in the state of the offering, noted that "an individual investor may be
equally (or even more) familiar with companies located around his or her place of employment as those
located near his or her residence." Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 62. Similarly, the 1963 Special Study
of Securities Markets noted that the section 3(a)(11) exemption "is typically available for the offering by a
small businessman of a limited amount of securities to his friends, relatives, business associates, and others."
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIssION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETs, H.R.
DOC. No. 95, 571 (1963).
113 See 7 HICKS, supra note 55, at 4-167 to 4-168 (rejecting the idea that investors' proximity to and
knowledge of the issuer justifies the intrastate offering exemption).
114 Under this view, section 3(a)(11) was designed to exempt "those securities which were being
supervised effectively by State regulation." Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 157 (6th Cir. 1969). As the
1963 Special Study of Securities Markets stated,
The exemption reflects a congressional policy... not to preempt the field of securities regulation
or to supersede State control, but rather to fill the gap in those areas where State regulation cannot
adequately meet a national need.... Small local offerings of this character ... can be adequately
supervised by State authority to the extent that regulation is deemed necessary.
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 112, at 570-71.
115 See 7 HICKS, supra note 55, at 4-168 to 4-169.
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m11. THE TRANSACTIONAL BASIS OF EXEMPTIONS FROM THE
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT
The exemptions from the registration requirement are transactional. An
issuer's entire offering must qualify for a single exemption, or registration is
required. Exemptions are not available for parts of an offering. This
transactional restriction has both horizontal and vertical elements. Consider
the following diagram:
ISSUER
Integration
V V Doctrine
INITIAL PURCHASERS
Underwriter
Doctrine
SECOND-LEVEL PURCHASER
The horizontal element of the transactional exemption structure, the
integration doctrine, focuses on sales of securities directly by the issuer. The
integration doctrine asks which of all the issuer's initial sales of securities
should be considered part of the same transactional offering. All of the sales
that are part of a single offering must comply with the requirements of a single
transaction exemption, or the exemption is lost. The horizontal element of the
transaction exemptions is the focus of this Article.
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The vertical element of the transaction exemptions-the underwriter
concept and the associated resale restrictions' 16-focuses on resales of
securities by those who purchase initially from the issuer.117 It considers the
initial purchasers' resales to what the diagram labels second-level purchasers,
and asks whether the sales to the second-level purchasers also should be
considered part of the issuer's transaction-in other words, whether the sales
should be treated as if the issuer sold directly to the second-level purchasers. If
so, then the resale, as part of the issuer's transaction, must also comply with
the terms of the issuer's transaction exemption, or the issuer's exemption is
lost. 1
8
I will first discuss the underwriter doctrine and the resale restrictions, and
then turn to the horizontal restrictions on exempt offerings.
A. Resale Restrictions
1. Introduction to the Underwriter Concept and Limits on Resales
The vertical element of the transaction-based exemptions rests on the
"underwriter" concept, by virtue of which the Securities Act limits resales by
those purchasing securities in an exempt offering. 119 The resale restrictions
prevent an issuer from circumventing the limits of an exemption by selling
through a conduit who immediately resells the security in a way the issuer's
exemption would not have allowed. The issuer's transaction is not completed
until the securities "come to rest."120  Resales prior to that time may be, 121
attributed to the issuer and thereby destroy the issuer's exemption.
116 For a more detailed discussion of the resale restrictions, see Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Resales of
Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933, 52 WASH. & L L. REV. 1333 (1995); see also J. William Hicks,
The Concept of Transaction as a Restraint on Resale Limitations, 49 OHIo ST. LJ. 417 (1988).
117 Or, in the case of multiple resales of the same security, the vertical element of the exemption includes
resales by those who purchase from the issuer's purchasers. See Hicks, supra note 116, at 435-36.
11 Id. at432-34.
119 The underwriter concept at times applies to sales of unrestricted securities by controlling persons of
the issuer. Under section 2(a)(1 1) of the Securities Act, the term "underwriter" includes any person offering or
selling for an issuer in connection with a distribution. 15 U.S.c. § 77b(a)(11) (1994). For purposes of section
2(a)(11), the term "issuer" includes afliliates.-"any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by
the issuer or any person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer." Id. Thus, if the affiliate's
resales constitute a distribution, any person selling for the affiliate would be an underwriter, destroying the
section 4(1) exemption. See id. § 77d(1) (1994). However, the rationale for restricting affiliate resales does
not turn on the transaction concept and is thus beyond the scope of this Article. See generally THOMAS LEE
HAzEa, THE LAw OF SEcuRrEs REuLATION 254 (3d ed. 1996).
120 See Hicks, supra note 116, at 432-34, 442-47.
121 Id. at 432-34.
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Section 5 of the Securities Act, containing the prohibitions that enforce the
Act's registration and prospectus delivery requirements, applies to "any
person," making no distinction between the initial sale of securities by an
issuer and subsequent resales of those securities. However, section 4(1) of
the Securities Act exempts from the requirements of section 5 "transactions by
any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer."123 An ordinary resale
is not usually made by the issuer of the security, 124 nor is the usual reseller a
dealer, defined as someone "in the business of offering, buying, selling or
otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another person."125 It is the
underwriter portion of the section 4(1) exemption that enforces the trans-
actional prohibition on resales.
The important part of the definition of an underwriter for this purpose is
"any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to ... the
distribution of any security." 126 This definition raises two key issues. First,
when the person purchased the security from the issuer, was his intent to resell
or was his intent to hold the security for investment purposes? To put it
another way, did he have investment intent when he purchased? Second, even
if he purchased with a view to reselling, are his resales a "distribution"?
Investment intent is difficult to prove, as it involves an inquiry into the
purchaser's state of mind. Investment intent is usually established by holding
the securities a sufficiently long period of time prior to resale. This holding
period demonstrates that the seller did not originally purchase the securities
intending to resell them.1 7 The exact amount of time necessary was unclear
until Rule 144 was adopted, but a two-year rule of thumb was often used.12 8
Even in the absence of an extended holding period, prior to the adoption of
Rule 144 a seller could prove investment intent by showing that he intended to
hold the securities, but a change of circumstances precipitated an earlier
sale. 1
29
122 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
123 Id. § 77d(1).
124 The term "issuer" is defined, somewhat circuitously, as "every person who issues or proposes to issue
any security," with some exceptions. Id. § 77b(4).
125 Id. § 77b(a)(12). Even if the person reselling happens to be a dealer, the Securities Act contains a
separate exemption for transactions by dealers who are not otherwise underwriters. Id. § 77d(3).
126 Id. § 77b(a)(11).
127 See HAZEN, supra note 119, at 261; Campbell, supra note 116, at 1344; 7B HICKS, supra note 55, at
§ 9.02[2] [a] [ii][A].
128 See HAZEN, supra note 119, at261.
129 See id. at 260; Campbell, supra note 116, at 1344; 7B HICKS, supra note 55, at § 9.02[2][a][ii][B].
When the SEC adopted Rule 144 in 1972, it indicated that it was eliminating the "change of circumstances"
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A seller who cannot establish investment intent may nevertheless avoid
underwriter status by showing that his resales are not a "distribution."
130
Although practice is somewhat divorced from theory, 131 for non-affiliate
resales, the goal is to ensure that the purchaser's resales are consistent with the
issuer's original transactional exemption-that the resale is not being used to
circumvent the limits on the issuer's original distribution. 132  Thus, for an
exempt intrastate offering, immediate resales to nonresidents would be
problematic, but resales within the state would not, because the issuer could
have made such sales directly. 133 For other exemptions with resale restrictions,
"distribution" is generally defined consistently with the Ralston Purina134
criteria used to define "private offering.' 3 5
2. Liberalization: Easing the Transactional Limits on Resales
The application of the section 2(a)(11) definition of underwriter to resales
is difficult at best. Thomas Hazen has written that "[t]he one clear lesson of
the cases and SEC decisions is that section [2(a)(ll)'s] definition of
underwriter is a trap for the careless and unwary. ' 136 To ease that uncertainty,the SEC has adopted two important safe harbor rules, Rules 144 and 144A. 137
As currently written, Rule 144 allows the resale of restricted securities after
a minimum holding period of one year,138 provided that the other conditions of
the rule are met: certain information about the issuer must be publicly
available, 139 only a limited number of securities may be sold, 14 the securities
concept. See Securities Act Release No. 5223, supra note 5, at 592. The SEC's authority to eliminate the
doctrine, which is based on the language in section 2(a)(l 1), has been questioned. See 3 Loss & SELIoMAN,
supra note 56, at 1514.
130 See Campbell, supra note 116, at 1345.
131 See Hicks, supra note 116, at 442-59.
132 Seeid. at431-35.
133 See id. at 433-34.
134 SEC. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (holding that whether an offering is "private" or
"public" turns on "whether the particular class of persons affected need the protections of the [Securities]
Act").
135 Hicks, supra note 116, at 449-54.
136 HAZEN, supra note 119, at 282.
137 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144-.144A (1999). In addition, Rule 147, the intrastate offering exemption safe
harbor, has its own nine-month resale restriction. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1999).
138 Id. § 230.144(d)(1).
139 Id. § 230.144(c).
140 Id § 230.144(e)(1).
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must be sold in "brokers' transactions,"" 4 and, in some cases, a notice of sale
must be filed with the SEC. 142 After a holding period of two years, a non-
affiliate of the issuer may freely resell without complying with these additional
conditions.1
43
Rule 144 has been substantially liberalized over the years. When it was
originally adopted in 1972, the minimum holding period was two years and the
conditions on resale applied no matter how long the securities were held."" In
1981, the SEC added section 144(k), eliminating all the additional conditions
except the public information requirement for non-affiliates who had held the
securities for three years. 145  In 1983, the SEC also eliminated the public
information requirement for Rule 144(k) sales. 146 The most recent changes
came in 1997, when the SEC reduced the generally applicable Rule 144
holding period from two years to one year and reduced the 144(k) holding
period from three years to two years. 147 At the same time, the SEC solicited
comments on whether the holding periods should be shortened even more, to
six months or even three months.
148
Thus, Rule 144's history has been one of gradual liberalization, with the
most dramatic changes coming in the last few years. As the SEC reduces the
Rule 144 holding period and eliminates the other restrictions on Rule 144
resales of restricted securities, it is, in essence, minimizing the transactional
connection between resales and the issuer's original transaction. The question
of whether the issuer's sales and the resales are part of the same transaction
persists, but it is much easier to conclude that they are not.
Rule 144A,149 adopted by the SEC in 1990,150 goes even further. Rule
144A rejects the transactional view entirely, completely divorcing resales from
141 Id. § 230.144(0. Rule 144 provides a non-exclusive definition of "brokers' transaction." See id.
§ 230.144(g).
142 Id. § 230.144(h).
141 Id. § 230.144(k).
144 See Securities Act Release No. 5223, supra note 5.
145 See Resales of Securities, Securities Act Release No. 6286,46 Fed. Reg. 12,195 (1981).
146 See Securities; Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 6488,48 Fed.
Reg. 44,770 (1983).
147 Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 7390,62
Fed. Reg. 9242 (1997).
148 Revision of Rule 144, Rule 145 and Form 144, Securities Act Release No. 7391, 62 Fed. Reg. 9246,
9250-51 (1997).
149 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(1999).
150 Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Holding Period of Restricted
Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 6862, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933 (1990).
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the exemption for the issuer's original sales. Rule 144A, like Rule 144,
protects a person who resells securities from being treated as an underwriter.
15 1
Rule 144A allows a purchaser to resell securities to certain institutional
investors, known as qualified institutional buyers. 152 Certain other conditions
must be met for Rule 144A to be available, 153 but the availability of Rule 144A
does not depend on how much time has expired since the securities were issued
or on whether the seller had investment intent when he purchased the
securities. The resales are completely divorced from the issuer's original
offering, no matter how soon they occur or how inconsistent they are with the
issuer's exemption. Rule 144A resales "shall be deemed not to affect the
availability of any exemption or safe harbor relating to any previous or
subsequent offer or sale of such securities by the issuer. '154
B. The Integration Doctrine
1. An Introduction to the Integration Doctrine
The second transactional element of the exemptions from registration is
horizontal. To avoid registration, the offering as a whole must meet the
requirements of a single exemption. An issuer may not use two or more
exemptions to cover parts of what is really a single transaction.'55 The SEC
uses the integration doctrine to determine what constitutes a single offering. If
two sets of sales are really part of the same transaction, the sales are
"integrated" and treated as a single offering, and the entire integrated offering
must qualify for a single exemption. The integration doctrine thus prevents an
issuer from separating a single offering into two parts and using a separate
exemption for each part (or registering one part and using an exemption for the
other part). 156
The integration doctrine originated in 1933, shortly after the passage of the
Securities Act. Section 3(a)(1 1) exempts securities that are "part of an issue
151 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(b) (1999).
152 ld. § 230.144A(d)(1). "Qualified institutional buyer" is defined at id. § 230.144A(a)(1).
153 ld. § 230.144A(d)(2)-(4). For a thorough review of these conditions and the rest of Rule 144A, see 7B
HICKS, supra note 55, ch. 10A.
154 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(e) (1999); see also C. Steven Bradford, Rule 144A and Integration, 20 SEC.
REG. L.J. 37 (1992).
155 See Hicks, supra note 116, at 431.
156 For a review of various contexts in which the integration doctrine can arise, see Stephen I. Glover, The
Offerings That Precede an Initial Public Offering-How to Preserve Exemptions and Avoid Integration, 24
SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1996).
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offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State or Territory."157
The Federal Trade Commission, which at the time enforced the Securities Act,
ruled that an issuer could not sell part of an issue using the intrastate offering
exemption and then sell the rest of the issue in an interstate registered public
offering. 15  Shortly after that ruling, the SEC held that even a single sale to a
non-resident could destroy the section 3(a)(11) exemption. 159  The SEC
subsequently indicated that the word "exclusively" in section 3(a)(9) and the
phrase "not involving any public offering" in section 4(2) similarly require that
the entire offering fall within one exemption.
160
Most of the major transaction exemptions adopted by the SEC now include
either language specifically incorporating the "offering" or "issue" concepts or
notes specifically warning of the possibility of integration. Rule 147, for
example, provides that "all securities of the issuer which are part of an issue
shall be offered, offered for sale or sold in accordance with all of the terms and
conditions of this rule."161  Regulation D similarly provides that "[all sales
that are part of the same Regulation D offering must meet all of the terms and
conditions of Regulation D."'162 The text of Regulation A does not expressly
adopt the offering or issue concept, but the SEC extended the concept to
Regulation A in 1948, 16 and a note accompanying Regulation A makes it clear
that the integration doctrine will be applied to offers or sales not protected by
,164 165
Regulation A's integration safe harbor. Regulation CE, the most recent
transaction exemption, does not expressly provide for integration, but it
mirrors a California state exemption which is itself transactional.
166
157 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1) (1994).
158 See Securities Act Release No. 97, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1021-1029, at 2056 (Dec. 28, 1933).
159 See Petersen Engine Co., 2 S.E.C. 893, 899 (1937).
160 See Securities Act Release No. 2029, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) (f 2140-2141, at 2584 (Aug. 8,
1939).
161 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b)(1) (1999) (emphasis added); see also id. § 230.147, Preliminary Note 3.
162 Id. § 230.502(a) (emphasis added) and accompanying note.
163 See Herbert R. May, 27 S.E.C. 814, 818-20 (1948).
'64 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c) (1999) and accompanying note.
165 Id. § 230.1001.
166 Regulation CE exempts offers or sales of securities that fall within § 25102(n) of the California
Corporations Code. Id. § 230.1001(a). Section 25102(n), in turn, exempts "[a]ny offer or sale of any security
in a transaction ... that meets all of the following criteria." CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n) (West 2000)
(emphasis added). Thus, it appears that the entire transaction must meet all of the criteria of the rule. In
interpreting another California exemption with similar transactional language, the California Commissioner of
Corporations stated:
The "transaction" referred to is one or more offers or sales of a security which have such a
connection with each other as to be considered one transaction for statutory purposes .... It is the
statutory concept of "transaction' which determines whether or not other offer or sales of
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In 1961, the SEC articulated a five-factor integration test to determine
when to integrate ostensibly separate offerings. 167 The SEC still uses this test,
which has also been followed by many courts. 168  The five-factor test asks
whether:
(1) the different offerings are part of a single plan of financing,
(2) the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security,
(3) the offerings are made at or about the same time,
(4) the same type of consideration is to be received, [and]
(5) the offerings are made for the same general purpose.169
All five factors do not need to be met in order for two offerings to be
integrated; according to the SEC, "[a]ny one or more" of the factors may be
determinative. 17  In practice, the SEC seems to give more weight to some of
the factors than to others,17 1 and some SEC interpretations of the integration
doctrine seem to utilize factors other than the five listed. 172
Closely related to the integration doctrine is the concept of aggregation, 173
which is used to calculate the maximum offering amount in some of the ex-
securities, past, present, or future, will be considered as constituting a part of the transaction under
the exemption and integrated with it, and whether such integration will result in a violation of any
of the limitations of the exemption.
Release No. 67-C, California Commissioner of Corporations, reprinted in IA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCII)
12,558, at 8054-55 (Oct. 20, 1981). However, there is some ambiguity in the text of Regulation CE itself.
See Bradford, supra note 96, at 448-49.
167 See Exemption for Local Offerings From Registration, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) H 2270-77, at 2608 (Dec. 6, 1961).
168 See, e.g., Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Prod. Corp., 982 F.2d 1130, 1140 (7th Cir. 1992);
SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally 3 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note 56, at
1233 n.8 (collecting cases following the five-factor test).
169 Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) R 2770-
83 (Nov. 6, 1962). Accord, Securities Act Release No. 4434, supra note 167.170 Securities Act Release No. 4434, supra note 167.
171 See Cox, supra note 55, at 429-31; 3 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note 56, at 1242. "In a number of no-
action letters, a single criterion ... has taken precedence over the remaining four." Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, Integration of Securities Offerings: Report of the Task Force on Integration, 41 Bus.
LAW. 595, 623 (1986).
172 See Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Integration of Securities Offerings: Obstacles to Capital Formation Remain
for Small Businesses, 45 WASH. & LEE L REV. 935, 940 (1988).173 See generally Bradford, supra note 12, at 657-58.
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emptions. Regulation A, Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D, and Regulation
CE all limit the aggregate offering price of an exempted offering. 1 4  That
maximum offering price must be reduced by the amount of other specified
sales of securities, usually without regard to whether those other sales are part
of the same offering. 175 For example, Rule 504's $1 million cap is reduced by
"the aggregate offering price for all securities sold within the twelve months
before the start of and during the offering of securities under this [Rule 504], in
reliance on any exemption under section 3(b), or in violation of section 5(a) of
the Securities Act."
17
The integration doctrine has been thoroughly criticized. A number of
authors have documented the problems the integration concept causes issuers
177in various contexts. I do not intend to repeat those demonstrations here, but
the consensus is clear: the integration doctrine "frustrate[s] issuers engaged in
the capital formation process, engulfing them in a sea of ambiguity,
uncertainty, and potential liability."' 78 As Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr.
concluded, "[e]veryone seems to agree that these criteria are nearly impossible
to apply, principally because neither the Commission nor the courts [has] ever
adequately articulated how ... [the five factors] ... are to be weighed or how
many factors must be present in order for integration to occur." 179 SEC staff
interpretations of the test in no-action letters have been confusing and
sometimes inconsistent.180  An American Bar Association subcommittee said
that the no-action letters dealing with integration were "difficult to reconcile
even when dealing with similar fact situations involving the same subject
174 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(b) (Regulation A), 230.504(b)(2) (Rule 504), 230.505(b)(2)(i) (Rule 505),
230.1001(b) (Regulation CE) (1999).
175 Regulation CE is an exception, wedding the aggregation and integration concepts. The Regulation CE
$5 million cap is reduced by "the aggregate offering price for all other securities sold in the same offering of
securities, whether pursuant to this or another exemption." Id. § 230.1001(b) (1999) (emphasis added). See
generally Bradford, supra note 96, at 448-49
176 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (1999). Compare id. § 230.505(b)(2)(i) (similar), with id, § 230.251(b)
(aggregating only other sales pursuant to Regulation A).
177 See Glover, supra note 156; Judith D. Fryer, Integration Issues in Real Estate Securities Offerings,
INSIGHTS, May 1995, at 13; Stanley Keller, Basic Securities Act Concepts Revisited, INSIGHTS, May 1995, at 5.
178 Wallace, supra note 172, at 989.
179 Campbell, supra note 14, at 164 (footnote omitted); accord Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities, supra note 161, at 623; Cheryl L Wade, The Integration of Securities Offerings: A Proposed
Formula That Fosters the Policies of Securities Regulation, 25 LoY. U. CH. LJ. 199, 222 (1994); Wallace,
supra note 172, at 940.
160 See Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Assoc., Integration of Partnership
Offerings: A Proposalfor Identifying a Discrete Offering, 37 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1605; Wade, supra note 179, at
221; Wallace, supra note 172, at 958.
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matter.' 181 The most charitable view that can be taken of the doctrine is that ithas some basis in economic theory, but simply is not worth its cost.182
2. Liberalization: Changes to the Integration Doctrine
The changes to the integration doctrine over the years have not been as
dramatic as the changes to the transactional nature of the registration system
and the resale restrictions. The SEC has adopted several integration safe
harbors, but there have been no challenges to the transaction concept as
significant as the company registration proposal or Rule 144A. The SEC has
been content merely to smooth out some of the integration doctrine's rougher
edges.
The SEC adopted the first integration safe harbor, Rule 152,183 in 1935.184
Rule 152 protects section 4(2) private offerings from integration if "sub-
sequently thereto the issuer decides to make a public offering and/or files a
registration statement. '' 185 Rule 152 received little attention until 1986, after
which a series of SEC no-action letters liberalized its application.186
The SEC has added several other integration safe harbors since it adopted
Rule 152. All of these additional safe harbors are tied to individual ex-
emptions. Some of these safe harbors turn on the passage of time between
offers: Rule 147 and Regulation D each provide that if two offerings are more
than six months apart and there are no other offers or sales of the same security
in the six-month period, the two offerings will not be integrated. 187 But other
integration safe harbors and SEC rulings allow simultaneous or nearly
simultaneous offerings pursuant to different exemptions. The SEC and its staff
have consistently taken the position that offerings made solely to foreign
181 Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Assoc., supra note 180, at 1605.
182 Bradford, supra note 12, at 666-70.
183 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1999).
184 See Securities Act Release No. 305 (Mar. 2, 1935), reprinted in Johnson & Patterson, supra note 15, at
582.
185 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1999).
186 See Johnson & Patterson, supra note 15, at 556-61; Gerald Backman & Robert Gervis, Integration
Revisited: The Black Box Restructuring, INSIGHTS, Feb. 1991, at 3. Significant uncertainties remain in the
application of the rule. See Keller, supra note 177, at 9.
187 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.147(b)(2), 230.502(a) (1999). Rule 502(a) allows "offers or sales of securities
under an employee benefit plan" within the six-month period. Id. § 230.502(a). These integration safe harbors
are "one-sided." They protect from integration only the offering pursuant to the regulation in which the safe
harbor appears. The other offering that presents the integration problem is still subject to integration and loss
of its exemption, unless it has its own integration safe harbor. See C. Steven Bradford, Regulation A and the
Integration Doctrine: The New Safe Harbor, 55 OIO ST. L.J. 255, 270-72 (1994).
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investors will not be integrated with domestic offerings, even if those offerings
are simultaneous. 188 Regulation A, which used to have only a six-month safe
harbor similar to the ones in Rule 147 and Regulation D, now baldly states that
Regulation A offerings will not be integrated with any prior offers or sales of
securities. 189 And, in addition to the usual six-month integration safe harbor
for subsequent offers, Regulation A also excludes from integration subsequent
offers or sales within six months that are registered, rely on Rule 701, are
pursuant to an employee benefit plan, or rely on Regulation S. 190  Rule 701,
which exempts offerings pursuant to certain compensatory benefit plans or
compensation contracts, protects the Rule 701 offering from integration with
"any other offering or sale whether registered under the Act or otherwise
exempt from the registration requirements of the Act."' 91
While the Advisory Committee was examining the registration system, an
internal SEC task force was considering, among other things, the exemptions
from registration. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt organized the Task Force on
Disclosure Simplification in August 1995 "to review rules and forms affecting
capital formation, with a view toward streamlining, simplifying, and modern-
izing the overall regulatory scheme without compromising or diminishing
important investor protections.' 92  Unfortunately, the Task Force's report,
issued in 1996, was much less revolutionary than the Advisory Committee's
company registration proposals. The Task Force proposals merely tinkered
188 This position dates at least to 1964, when the SEC indicated in a release that section 4(2) private
offerings and foreign offerings would not be integrated. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic
Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 4708, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1361-63, at 2124 (July 9, 1964); see
also College Retirement Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,503, at 77,612 (June 4, 1987); College Retirement Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,420, at 77,361 (Feb. 18, 1987). Subsequent no-action letters
extended this protection from integration to domestic offerings under section 3(a)(11) and Rule 147 and to
domestic registered offerings. See Commonwealth Equity Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,412, at 77,332 (Jan. 20 1987); Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 78,164 (June 5, 1985); Scientific Mfg., Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [ 77,505, at 78,625 (May 12, 1983);
Willianms Island Assoc., Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28343 (May 4, 1983). A note to Rule 502(a)
of Regulation D extends this protection from integration to Regulation D offerings, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a),
Note, and Rule 251(c)(2)(ii) extends this protection to Regulation A offerings, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)(2)(ii)
(1999).
189 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)(1) (1999).
'90 I § 230.251(c)(2)(i)-(iv).
191 Id. § 230.701(b)(6).
192 Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 1; see also Regulation D; Accredited Investor and Filing
Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 6825, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,369 (1989) (adopting changes).
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with the existing exemption system and proposed no significant changes to its
transactional foundation.
The Task Force's most significant integration proposals relate to Rule 152
and the integration of exempt offerings with public offerings. The Task Force
suggested that Rule 152 be liberalized to allow a company to switch from a
private offering to a public offering without any delay and to allow a company
"to engage in 'test the waters' offering activities among qualified investors in
reliance on the private offering exemption prior to filing a registration
statement."'193 The Task Force recommended that the SEC also consider
similar protection for offerings exempted by the section 3(b) exemptions-that
an exempt offering "not be integrated with either a subsequent public offering
or an earlier abandoned public offering." 194 Further, the Task Force asked the
SEC to consider whether a company should be able to begin an offering as an
exempt offering and complete it as a registered offering, without integration
problems. 195 Finally, the Task Force proposed to eliminate the "presumptive
public offering" doctrine, which deems the filing of a registration statement a
solicitation and precludes an immediate exempted offering if the company
decides a public offering is not feasible. 19 6 The Task Force asked the SEC to
"consider adopting a safe harbor that would allow a company to access the
private markets while it has 'quietly' filed a registration statement."
197
The Aircraft Carrier, which for the most part does not deal with the
transaction exemptions or the integration doctrine, followed the Task Force's
lead in proposing some fairly significant changes to Rule 152.19' The Aircraft
Carrier proposals would expand Rule 152 to include other private offerings in
addition to section 4(2) offerings, would clarify the existing rule, and would
codify some of the SEC staff's interpretations of Rule 152, which currently
appear in no-action letters. Most significantly, the Aircraft Carrier proposals
would add a new safe harbor for private offerings following an abandoned
registered offering. 199
193 Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 41.
'94 Id. at 41-42.
195 Id.
196 Id. at42.
197 Id.
198 Aircraft Carier, supra note 5, at 67,234-38. For a more thorough discussion of these proposals, see
Stanley Keller, The SEC Integration Proposals, INSIGHTS, Jan. 1999, at 23.
199 The existing safe harbor covers situations where the public offering follows the private offering. See
17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1999).
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Two other Task Force proposals concern the transactional basis of the
exemptions from registration. One would make an exemption less
transactional and the other would make an exemption more transactional. The
Task Force suggested that a substantial compliance provision be added to Rule
147 (or the "local offering" successor to Rule 147 proposed by the Task Force)
so that the exemption would not be lost due to an inadvertent, innocent sale to
a non-resident.200 In other words, the innocent sale would not be integrated
into the Rule 147 offering to destroy the Rule 147 exemption. But another
Task Force proposal suggested a change in the opposite direction-toward a
more transactional view. After proposing a change in the dollar amount of
Regulation A,201 the Task Force suggested an alternative-that Regulation A
be amended so that, instead of $5 million a year, the limit would be $5 million
per offering, "applying standard integration analysis to determine when
multiple offerings in fact constitute a single offering."2°2 The Task Force's
goal apparently was to allow multiple $5 million offerings in a single twelve-
month period. The SEC has yet to act on the Rule 147 and Regulation A
proposals.
IV. THE DILEMMA POSED BY THE CURRENT SYSTEM
The transactional basis of the exemptions from registration presents a
dilemma. On the one hand, the all-or-nothing basis of the integration doctrine
traps unwary issuers and, because it does not adequately capture the marginal
effect of sales of securities on the case for registration, the doctrine forces
registration in situations where offerings should be exempt. On the other hand,
eliminating the integration doctrine entirely would give issuers carte blanche to
split their offerings freely and avoid registration even when there is no policy
basis for an exemption-when the benefits to investors of registering the entire
offering would exceed the cost. Unable to find a global solution to this
200 Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 62-63. To take advantage of the proposed substantial compliance
rule, three conditions would have to be met: "a) the issuer must have reasonably believed that the non-resident
was in fact a resident; b) the number of inadvertent non-resident purchasers was de minimis; and c) the issuer
must have made a good faith effort to comply with all of the Rule's provisions." Id. at 63. The Task Force also
proposed to change Rule 147's focus from offerees to purchasers, so there would be no violation of the rule if
a non-resident inadvertently became an offeree. Id. at 63.
201 The Task Force recommended that the twelve month, $5 million limit in Regulation A be changed to
$5 million every six months. According to the Task Force, "[c]hanging the limit on the ceiling in this way
would assure that small businesses have more frequent access to the marketplace and can continue to play their
essential role in the success of the U.S. market system." Id. at 65-66.
202 Il at 66.
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dilemma that would balance investor protection and cost minimization, the
SEC retained the integration doctrine and developed narrow integration safe
harbors to ease at least some of the burden on issuers. Almost everyone
concedes that this solution is inadequate, but no one has been able to resolve
the dilemma.
A. The Problem with the Integration Doctrine
20The main failing of the integration doctrine, other than its uncertainty, °1 is
its failure to consider the case for registration on a marginal basis. Assume, for
example, that an issuer sells $2.5 million of securities to thirty-five purchasers
in a Rule 505 offering. It then sells $10 more of the securities to a single
purchaser in an offering that, considered alone, complies with Rule 504.
Assume further that the $10 sale would be integrated with the $2.5 million
offering.204 Rule 504 would not be available to this integrated offering because
it exceeds the $1 million limit. Rule 505 would not be available because the
integrated offering exceeds Rule 505's thirty-five-purchaser limit. Since no
exemption is available for the entire, integrated offering, the offering should
have been registered. The issuer is in violation of the Securities Act, and the
purchasers may rescind.205
This application of the integration doctrine obviously makes no sense. The
issuer could have sold an additional $2.5 million of the security to the first
thirty-five purchasers without triggering registration. The $5 million limit, to
the extent it is rational, represents a policy judgment that, even adding the
additional $2.5 million to the offering, registration would not be cost-effective.
If that is true, it cannot be true that a single $10 sale under Rule 504 makes
registration of the integrated offering cost-effective. Absent implausible
assumptions, the marginal change cannot justify registration.
A simple analogy illustrates the folly of the integration doctrine's failure to
use marginal analysis. Assume that, to track more accurately its balance of
payments, the United States enacts a law requiring citizens to report any
currency taken out of the country. However, it gives a new federal agency, the
203 See supra text accompanying notes 177-81.
204 Even absent integration, aggregation would preclude these two offerings. The $1 million maximum
offering amount in Rule 504 is reduced by the aggregate offering price of all securities sold within the prior
twelve months pursuant to any section 3(b) exemption such as Rule 505. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (1999).
Thus, at the time of the $10 sale, the Rule 504 cap would be zero. The exemption would not be available.
Everything said in the text about integration would also apply to the aggregation rules.
205 See 15 U.S.C. § 771(1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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Federal Currency Agency, the authority to exempt transactions from the
reporting requirement if the cost to report a particular transaction exceeds the
benefit. The agency decides that the cost of reporting any withdrawals of one
dollar or less exceeds any benefit of the report, so it enacts four exemptions.
Rule 1 says you may take up to four quarters out of the country without
reporting. Rule 2 says you may take up to ten dimes out of the country without
reporting. Rule 3 says you may take up to twenty nickels out of the country
without reporting. Rule 4 says you may take up to one hundred pennies out of
the country without reporting.
A person tries to take two quarters and three dimes out of the country and is
promptly arrested for failing to file a report. The agency rejects his argument
that his withdrawal was exempt from the reporting requirements. "You violate
Rule 1," the agency says, "because it allows only quarters. And you violate
Rule 2 because it allows only dimes. And our currency integration doctrine
says all your coins must fall within a single rule. You cannot combine
exemptions."
This makes no sense, of course, but neither does the application of the
SEC's integration doctrine in the earlier securities example. The solution to
the currency example is obvious: add all the change a person tries to take out
of the country, and if the total exceeds one dollar, regardless of the
combination of coins, he must file a report. In totaling the coins, we are
engaging in marginal analysis: As we add each coin to the total, does that
additional coin tip the scale in favor of reporting?
We need some way of totaling the amounts of securities sold pursuant to
various exemptions to determine whether the total offering justifies
registration-to combine the "quarters" and "dimes" of the exemptions from
registration, rather than insisting that each offering consist of all "quarters" or
all "dimes." And we cannot just total the combined dollar amount of the
offerings any more than we can just count the total number of coins. Different
exemptions offer different levels of investor protection. Adding to an offering
a dollar's worth of securities sold pursuant to Regulation A bolsters the case
for registration less than adding a dollar's worth of the same security sold
pursuant to Rule 504 (just like adding a penny to the currency taken out of the
country bolsters the case for reporting less than adding a quarter). A purchaser
in a Regulation A offering gains less from registration than a purchaser in a
Rule 504 offering, because the Regulation A purchaser is already receiving
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substantial disclosure. We need a more sophisticated system for "counting"
securities sold in different exempted transactions.
B. The Safe Harbors as an Incomplete Solution
The integration safe harbors2°6 show that the SEC recognizes and is trying
to correct at least some of the problems with the integration doctrine. And the
integration safe harbors do ameliorate the problems the transactional
exemptions create, although they do not solve them completely.
Academics and practicing lawyers have presented a number of proposals to
improve the transactional exemptions by expanding or revising the integration
safe harbors. The most ambitious undertaking was the 1986 proposal of the
Task Force on Integration, established by the American Bar Association's
Committee on the Federal Regulation of Securities. The Task Force on
Integration began with the goal of formulating "an analytical matrix, based
upon objective criteria, for resolving all integration problems. 2 °7 However, it
gave up on that ambitious task, in part because it could not reach a consensus
and in part because it did not believe the SEC would embrace such a
208comprehensive approach. It instead proposed a series of broader safe
harbors that turned on the distinctions between issuers, 09 the time between two
offerings, 21  the type of securities being offered, the purposes of the
offerings, 212 and the type of exemption being used.
213
206 See supra text accompanying notes 183-91.
207 Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, supra note 171, at 597.
208 Id.
209 The Task Force simply adopted the issuer integration proposal made four years earlier by another
ABA committee, the Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Associations. Id. at 631-32.
210 The Task Force accepted the six-month integration safe harbor already present in some of the
Securities Act rules: offerings would not be integrated if they were more than six months apart. Id. at 632-33.
211 The Task Force classified all securities into four defined classes-common stock, preferred stock,
unsecured debt, and secured debt. Offerings would not be integrated if they involved different classes. Id. at
633-35.
212 The Task Force classified the purposes of securities offerings into four basic purposes: "(i) to raise
funds for general purposes; (ii) to eliminate specific indebtedness through an exchange offering; (iii) to obtain
human resources; and (iv) to acquire specific properties or businesses." Id. at 635. Offerings would not be
integrated if they were made for different purposes. See id. at 635-36.
213 The Task Force proposed several "policy safe harbors." Id. at 636-41. Section 3(a)(9) exchange
offerings by reporting companies would not be integrated with other offerings. See id. at 637. Section
3(a)(10) offerings would also be protected from integration with other offerings, but that protection would only
be one-sided. Integration would not destroy the section 3(a)(10) exemption, but the proposed safe harbor
would not protect the other offering from integration. See id. No offering would be integrated with a
registered public offering. See id. at 638. And domestic offerings would not be integrated with foreign
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Other authors have suggested similar modifications to the integration
doctrine.2 14  Some authors have called for adoption of the ABA tests,
sometimes with modifications. 21  A few have proposed temporal safe harbors
216shorter than six months. Others have proposed modifications to the SEC's
21728five-factor test for integration. Some have suggested multiple approaches.218
Unfortunately, given the many ways offerings can be combined, a system
of safe harbors can never be complete. The transactional integration doctrine
would continue to apply to anything not covered by the safe harbors; as to
219those sales, the problem is the same. The safe harbor approach is at best a
offerings, "so long as counsel structures the foreign offering to avoid any potential sale or resale of the offered
securities to U.S. residents" Id. at 640-41.
214 See, e.g., Darryl B. Deaktor, Integration of Securities Offerings, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 465, 541-44
(1979) (calling for liberalized integration safe harbors, including a three month temporal safe harbor); Ronald
L. Fein & Brian J. Jacobs, 15 REV. SEC. REG. 785, 793 (1982) (suggesting that transactions be treated as
discrete unless they are part of a single plan of financing, involve the same class of security, and are
contemporaneous); Kathryn Taylor Frame, Securities Regulation: Integration of Securities Offerings, 34
OKLA. L REV. 864, 886 (1981) (calling for the SEC and state securities commissioners to develop a specific,
objective test or definition for integration); Johnson & Patterson, supra note 15 (calling for a more liberal
interpretation of Rule 152 and an extension of its logic to offerings under other exemptions); Fred A. Little &
Robert B. Robbins, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 829, 837 (1986) (approving the tests proposed by the ABA
Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Associations); Ronald M. Shapiro & Alan R. Sachs,
Integration Under the Securities Act: Once An Exemption, Not Always..., 31 MD. L. REv. 3, 26 (1971)
(suggesting a twelve month temporal safe harbor, limited to no more than two offerings in a 36-month period);
Wade, supra note 179, at 236-40 (urging a two-part inquiry: (1) adoption of the ABA Task Force's proposed
safe harbors, plus a safe harbor for offerings that do not involve the same type of consideration; and (2) even
outside the safe harbors, no integration if the issuer can articulate a "rational business reason" for dividing the
offerings); Wallace, supra note 172, at 967-89 (recommending adoption of the safe harbors proposed by the
ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities with some modifications, including a shorter temporal
safe harbor).
215 See Little & Robbins, supra note 214, at 837 (approving the tests proposed by the ABA Subcommittee
on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Associations); Daniel J. Morrissey, Integration of Securities
Offerings-The ABA's "Indiscreet" Proposal, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 41 (1984) (opposing the recommendations of
the Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Associations); Wade, supra note 179, at 236-40
(urging a two-part inquiry, including adoption of the ABA Task Force's proposed safe harbors); Wallace,
supra note 172, at 967-89 (recommending adoption of the safe harbors proposed by the ABA Committee on
Federal Regulation of Securities with some modifications, including a shorter temporal safe harbor).
216 See Deaktor, supra note 214, at 543 (suggesting a three-month safe harbor); Wallace, supra note 162,
at 972-73 (suggesting a period of shorter than six months).
217 See Fein & Jacobs, supra note 214, at 793 (suggesting that the same "type of consideration" and same
"general purpose" factors be eliminated and that offerings be integrated only if all three of the other factors are
present).
218 See Wade, supra note 179, at 236-40 (urging a two-part inquiry: (1) adoption of the ABA Task Force's
proposed safe harbors, plus a safe harbor for offerings that do not involve the same type of consideration; and
(2) consideration of a "rational business reason" for dividing the offerings as a protection from integration).
219 See Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts & Unincorporated Assoc., supra note 180, at 1607.
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"patchwork ... [with] ... a number of sizable holes. ' 220  To return to the
currency example,221 a safe harbor might allow the combined exemption of
two quarters and five dimes, but exclude the other possible change
combinations that are equivalent to a dollar. Moreover, the very proliferation
of integration safe harbors can confuse issuers. Something more than safe
harbors is needed.
C. The Problem with Abolishing the Integration Doctrine Entirely
A more drastic response to the problems with the integration doctrine is to
eliminate it entirely: allow issuers to use the various exemptions in any
combination they choose. Rutheford Campbell argued over a decade ago that
the integration doctrine should be abolished, replaced by "the simple notion
that any offer or sale of securities that meets either the registration
requirements or the exemption requirements should not be contaminated by
other offers or sales. 222 Others have gone almost as far. In 1979, Darryl
Deaktor also briefly suggested the complete elimination of the integration
doctrine, but only after the SEC made unspecified changes to the underlying
exemptions so that "[flragmenting a single transaction into multiple offerings,
each of which fully conforms to one of these rules, ... [would not be] ...
repugnant to the interests of investors. 223 And Homer Kripke in 1983 called
for the almost total elimination of the integration doctrine.
2
Unfortunately, a completely non-transactional approach is just as
problematic as the integration doctrine itself, and for the same reason: It does
not consider the marginal impact of additional sales on the economic case for
registration. It allows an issuer to avoid registration even where it may be cost-
effective.22
5
220 Glover, supra note 156, at 21.
221 See supra Part V.B.
222 Campbell, supra note 14, at 169.
22 Deaktor, supra note 214, at 544-46, This proposal was a relatively minor part of Professor Deaktor's
article; his main argument was for an expansion of the integration safe harbors.
224 Kripke proposed that "[a]ll bases for exemption may be used in tandem or successively, unless it can
clearly be seen that they do in fact nullify each other." Homer Kripke, Has the SEC Taken All the Dead Wood
Out ofIts Disclosure System?, 38 Bus. LAW. 833, 843 (1983). According to Kripke, this would occur when
"the group becomes so large and unwieldy and so lacking in selectivity (because of public advertising or the
like) that the offering cannot be properly controlled to make sure that one or the other of the bases for
exemption will apply to each purchaser." aL Kripke provided no specific examples, nor did he indicate how
his integration standard would be any more coherent or wieldy than the SEC's integration doctrine.
225 This assumes that registration is sometimes cost-effective-that, for some offerings, the benefits of
registration outweigh its costs. Some authors have questioned whether any registration requirement is
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Assume that, once the size of an ordinary offering to unsophisticated
investors reaches $5 million, registration is economically justified on a cost-
benefit basis.226 This is consistent with the current $5 million maximum in the
small offering exemptions. If the integration doctrine and the related
aggregation limits were abolished, the issuer could sell $1 million worth of
securities pursuant to Rule 504, $5 million pursuant to Rule 505 and $5 million
pursuant to Regulation A. The total offering amount would be $11 million,
well above the amount at which registration makes sense.227 Thus, if the issuer
is free to combine exemptions without limit, offerings that should be registered
will be exempted. To return to the currency reporting example,228 a person
might leave the country with four quarters, ten dimes, twenty nickels, and a
hundred pennies, a total of four dollars. Because the four quarters are exempt
under Rule 1, the ten dimes are exempt under Rule 2, the twenty nickels are
exempt under Rule 3, and the one hundred pennies are exempt under Rule 4,
no reporting would be required, even though the total amount far exceeds the
amount at which currency reporting is cost-effective.
V. RESOLVING THE DILEMMA: A WEIGHTED EXEMPTION SYSTEM
It is necessary to rethink the transaction exemptions to develop a system
that allows issuers to use multiple exemptions where appropriate but retains the
registration requirement when it is cost-effective-a system, in other words,
that is efficient, but not subject to manipulation. The answer lies in a weighted
exemption system. An issuer could use multiple exemptions for a single
offering, subject to an overall dollar amount limit. In calculating whether an
issuer's total sales fall within that limit, sales pursuant to each exemption
would be weighted based on the amount of investor protection the particular
economically justified. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure Under Federal
Securities Laws, in WALL STREET IN TRANSrrION THE EMERGING SYSTEM AND rrs IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY
21 (Henry G. Manne & Ezra Solomon eds., 1974); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities
Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117 (1964). For purposes of this Article, I accept the conventional wisdom that the
benefits of registering non-exempted offerings exceed the costs. If not, the solution is not to abolish the
integration doctrine, but to eliminate the Securities Act registration requirement.
226 That is, the benefits of registration are greater than the costs and the net benefit of registration is
greater than the net benefit of any of the exemptions.
2 Even if the aggregation limits were retained, a single issuer could still sell $5 million of securities
pursuant to Rule 505, followed by another $5 million pursuant to Regulation A. The Rule 504 aggregate
offering price limit is only reduced by the amount of prior and concurrent sales, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i)
(1999), and the Regulation A aggregate offering price limit is only reduced by the amount of prior Regulation
A sales. Id. § 230.251(b).
M See supra Part IV.B.
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exemption provides. Sales pursuant to Rule 504 would count more towards the
overall limit than Regulation A sales, for example, because Rule 504 provides
less investor protection.
A. Using Multiple Small Offering Exemptions
Consider first the various small offering exemptions. Each small offering
exemption provides a different level of investor protection. Rule 504, the least
restrictive small offering exemption, also provides the least investor
protection. 229 Small offering exemptions such as Rule 505 and Regulation A,
on the other hand, have disclosure requirements and other limitations that
provide greater protection to investors.
The difference in the maximum dollar amounts of the small offering
exemptions-$5 million for Rule 505 and Regulation A but only $1 million for
Rule 504-reflects this difference. Because of the reduced investor protection,
each dollar an investor invests in a Rule 504 offering is more at risk than a
dollar invested in a Rule 505 or Regulation A offering. In Rule 505 and
Regulation A offerings, the disclosure and information requirements provide
investors with some, but not all, of the benefits registration would provide.231
As a result, the marginal benefit of registration per dollar invested is greater for
Rule 504 investors than for investors in Rule 505 or Regulation A offerings.
Rule 505 and Regulation A offerees are already receiving more of the benefits
that registration would provide, so the marginal gain per dollar of registering
the offering would be less for them than for Rule 504 offerees.
This non-controversial insight is the key to developing a system that allows
multiple exemptions for a single offering. If the marginal gains from
registration are less for certain exemptions, then sales pursuant to those
exemptions should contribute less to the overall cap above which registration is
required. But how much less? How can we compare the marginal benefits of
registration for the various exemptions? The answer lies in the offering
amount limits of the exemptions.
The baseline for any rational system of exemptions from registration is
some sort of de minimis exemption-an offering amount below which
offerings should be completely and unconditionally exempted. Unconditional
229 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
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exemption would mean that no disclosure is mandated, 232 neither the SEC nor
an alternative regulator reviews the offering, the manner of the offering is not
restricted, and the investors are not required to have any special expertise or
relationship to the issuer that would allow them to protect themselves. Even
for an offering like this, there is some offering amount below which it is not
cost-effective to require registration. If the total offering amount is ten dollars,
for example, it would cost more to require registration than a total loss of the
investment would cost investors. The cost of registration exceeds the benefit
to investors, no matter how generously the benefits are measured. It makes
sense neither to require registration nor to impose lesser conditions on the
offering. As the dollar amount of such an unrestricted offering increases, the
benefit of registering the offering increases at a faster rate than the cost;2
33
eventually, the benefit of registration exceeds the cost.234 The dollar amount
below which registration is not cost-effective could be called the baseline
exemption amount.
235Until the 1999 amendments to Rule 504, the baseline amount seemed to
be $1 million, the Rule 504 maximum. Rule 504 contained no disclosure
requirements, the manner of the offering was not restricted, the exemption was
not conditioned on review by the states or any other regulator, and the offering
could be made to anyone.236 If the $1 million cap was correct, that must have
been the offering amount at which the SEC believed the benefit of registering a
previously unrestricted offering exceeded the cost. The $1 million figure could
have been wrong, but Rule 504 was rational only if the SEC believed $1
million was the baseline exemption amount. Since the Rule 504 amendments,
there is no unconditional federal exemption from registration.2 37 Until the SEC
develops a new de minimis exemption, Rule 504, the least restrictive
exemption with the lowest offering amount, can serve as the baseline.
The initial rule is simply a restatement of Rule 504: if an issuer is using
only the baseline Rule 504 exemption, registration should be required if the
dollar amount of the offering exceeds $1 million.
232 This does not necessarily mean that issuers would provide no information to investors. Issuers have an
economic incentive to provide disclosure to investors even when disclosure is not mandated. See FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 286-94 (199 1).
233 This is due to the high fixed costs of registration and the assumption that, for at least some offerings,
registration is justified. See Bradford, supra note 12, at 614-18.
234 See supra note 61.
235 See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
236 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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Turn now to the Rule 505 and Regulation A exemptions. Because of the
additional protection those exemptions provide investors, 238 the marginal gain
from registration per dollar invested is less than for Rule 504 offerings. Or, to
put it another way, the dollar amount of a Rule 505 or Regulation A offering
must be greater before the benefit of registering that offering exceeds the cost.
For those exemptions to be rational, the cut-off point, or the point at which
registration provides a greater net benefit than the exemption, must be $5
million. If the amount of the offering exceeds $5 million under either of those
exemptions, registration is required. We can state Rule 505 and Regulation A
as follows: if an issuer is using only the Rule 505 exemption, registration
should be required if the dollar amount of the offering exceeds $5 million.
Similarly, if an issuer is using only the Regulation A exemption, registration
should be required if the dollar amount of the offering exceeds $5 million.
We can restate the Rule 505 and Regulation A exemptions to make their
offering amount limits more directly comparable to Rule 504:
1. If an issuer is using only the Rule 505 exemption, divide the dollar
amount of the offering by 5. Call this the adjusted amount. If the adjusted
amount exceeds $1 million, registration is required.
2. If an issuer is using only the Regulation A exemption, divide the dollar
amount of the offering by 5. Call this the adjusted amount. If the adjusted
amount exceeds $1 million, registration is required.
These restatements are equivalent to the current rules, but now state all
three small offering exemptions in terms of a single $1 million dollar cap. All
that differs is how the amount is calculated. Offerings under Rule 505 and
Regulation A only count one-fifth as much because, given the greater investor
protection each provides (and assuming that the dollar amounts of the
exemptions are correct), the marginal benefit of registration is only one-fifth as
much.
Now that the three small offering exemptions are stated in comparable
terms, it is easy to see how to combine them in a single offering. Since the
adjusted amounts are based on the marginal benefits of registration for each
type of offering, the benefit of registration exceeds its cost only when the total
adjusted amount exceeds $1 million, no matter the exemption under which the
sales occur. Thus, an issuer should be able to spread an offering among the
238 See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
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three exemptions as desired, as long as the total adjusted amount of the
offering does not exceed $1 million. To decide whether an issuer must
register, we simply make the following calculations: 239
1. Divide the dollar amounts of securities sold under Regulation A by 5.
2. Divide the dollar amounts of securities sold under Rule 505 by 5.
3. Add the Regulation A adjusted amount, the Rule 505 adjusted amount,
and the Rule 504 dollar amount.
4. If the total adjusted amount is $1 million or less,240 the offering is
exempt. If not, registration is required.
This becomes even simpler in a form:
WEIGHTED EXEMPTION CALCULATION
1. Rule 504 Dollar Amount = $
2. Rule 505 Dollar Amount - 5= $
3. Regulation A Dollar Amount +5= $
TOTAL OF 1, 2, AND 3 $
An exemption is available only if the TOTAL is $1 million or less.
Otherwise, registration is required.
239 The mathematical calculation required is simple. No one can possibly object to the proposal on the
ground of complexity, especially given the metaphysical meditation currently required to apply the integration
doctrine.
240 The aggregate offering price in Rule 504, Rule 505, and Regulation A is currently calculated using a
one-year period. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(b), 230.504(b)(2), 230.505(b)(2)(i) (1999). The same time period
could be used for my proposal.
There is, of course, nothing magical about either the one-year period or the $1 million amount. The
exemption amount could be $500,000 over six months, $2 million over one year, $10 million over two years,
or whatever amount/time combination one believed represented an appropriate tradeoff between the cost and
benefit of registration. The SEC staff has itself proposed to change Regulation A to a $5 million, six-month
exemption. See Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 65-66. Changes like that require no significant changes
to the weighted exemption proposal. If the Regulation A amount is changed as proposed, an appropriate
adjustment can be made in calculating the contribution of Regulation A sales to the overall amount. If the
Task Force's proposed amendment were adopted, Regulation A would allow sales of $10 million per year. See
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The weighted exemption system makes it easier to adjust the exemption
amounts for inflation or other cost changes because all of the exemptions are
linked to a single dollar amount. The rule establishing that amount could
include an automatic annual adjustment pegged to some measure of
inflation." 1 And having all exemptions tied to a single dollar cap allows easy
adjustment for other external changes. If, for example, the cost of registration
decreases due to technological changes or amendments to the registration
requirement, the tradeoff between costs and benefits also changes.242 The SEC
can quickly adjust all of the exemptions to reflect the new tradeoff. And, even
though the exemptions would be intertwined in a single combined system,
changes to one exemption will not necessitate changes to the entire system.
The SEC could, for example, increase the Regulation A dollar amount merely
by changing its fractional weight in the weighted exemption system.
B. Dealing with the Sophisticated Offeree and Deference Exemptions
The system explained above allows an issuer to use any combination of the
small offering exemptions. If the weighted exemption system only went this
far, it would be a tremendous improvement over the existing system. But how
do the sophisticated offeree and deference exemptions fit into this proposed
framework? The SEC could refuse to allow the sophisticated offeree and
deference exemptions to be combined with small offering exemptions. Or the
SEC could incorporate these other exemptions into the weighted exemption
system, assigning each of them appropriate fractional weights. However, the
approach most consistent with the current structure of the sophisticated offeree
exemptions and their underlying policies is not to count such sales within the
base exemption amount at all: in effect, they should be given a zero weight.
An issuer should be able to combine sophisticated offeree exemptions with
other exemptions without limit.243  Determining how to treat deference ex-
emptions is a little more difficult. A case could be made for treating them like
hi Thus, each dollar of sales pursuant to Regulation A would count as 1/10 of a dollar for purposes of the
overall cap.
241 1 have previously explained why the exemption amount ought to be adjusted for inflation. See
Bradford, supra note 12, at 622.
242 To take an extreme example, assume that someone develops a new technology that allows issuers to
beam an easily accessible electronic prospectus into everyone's home at virtually no cost. This would lower
the cost of maldng a registered offering, changing the cost-benefit calculation used to draw the line between
registered and exempted offerings. If it wanted to, the SEC could require the registration of more offerings
simply by adjusting the overall weighted exemption cap.
243 This is a fairly drastic change to existing law, so it is worth repeating that it is not an essential element
of the proposed weighted exemption system.
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the small offering exemptions-assigning them a weight based on the amount
of investor protection they provide. However, their current structure suggests
that they should be assigned a zero weight and be used freely with other
exemptions.
1. Sophisticated Offeree Exemptions
Consider first the sophisticated offeree exemptions. They are premised on
the negligible benefit that registration provides sophisticated investors. 244 The
law presumes that these investors can protect themselves; thus, registration
simply is not worth the cost.2 45 When sales to those sophisticated investors are
combined with sales of the same security to unsophisticated investors, nothing
changes with respect to the sophisticated investors. As to them, the cost of
registration still exceeds the benefit. And the sales to the sophisticated offerees
do not in any way increase the benefit of registration for the other purchasers.
Each portion of the offering must stand or fall on its own; if registration is not
justified for either offering alone (hence the exemptions), combining the two
will not change the cost-benefit tradeoff enough to alter that conclusion.
The existing structure of the sophisticated offeree exemptions supports this
conclusion. The dollar amount of the sophisticated offeree exemptions is
generally unlimited.246 If this makes sense, it must reflect a judgment that the
total cost of registering an offering to sophisticated offerees always exceeds the
total benefit, no matter how large the offering. But this is true only if the
marginal cost of registration (per dollar of securities sold) always exceeds the
244 See supra Part II.B.
245 Howard Friedman argues convincingly that some of the individuals left unprotected by the
sophisticated offeree exemptions do need additional protection. See Friedman, supra note 81, at 293.
However, the response to Friedman's criticism lies in changes to the exemptions themselves or to other aspects
of securities law, not in the integration doctrine.
246 There are two exceptions. One is section 4(6) of the Securities Act, which limits the offering to the
amount allowed in section 3(b) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1994). However, section 4(6) is used little, if
at all. See COX, supra note 55, at 425.
A second, more important, exception is the latest sophisticated offeree exemption, Regulation CE,
which has a $5 million limit. 17 C.F.R. § 230.1001(b) (1999). This limit is a result of previous statutory limits
on the SEC's power, not of policy considerations. Regulation CE is a section 3(b) exemption, and $5 million
is the maximum allowed under section 3(b) of the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994); Exemption
for Certain California Limited Issues, Securities Act Release No. 7185, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,638, at 35,639 (1995)
(proposed June 27, 1995). The SEC now has greater exemptive authority under section 28 of the Securities
Act but has not yet used that authority to increase any exemption amounts above $5 million. See 15 U.S.C.
§77z (1994).
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marginal benefit of registration.247 If so, then adding a sophisticated offeree
offering to any other offering cannot bolster the economic case for
registration.
248
2. Deference Exemptions
It is unclear how to treat the deference exemptions in a weighted exemption
system. On the one hand, the deference exemptions, like the sophisticated
offeree exemptions, have no offering amount limit.249  As with the
sophisticated offeree exemptions, this policy makes sense only if the total cost
of registering a deference exemption offering always exceeds the total benefit,
no matter how large the offering. If this is the case, then the marginal cost of
registration for such an offering (per dollar of securities sold) exceeds the
marginal benefit of registration, and adding a deference offering to any other
offering cannot bolster the economic case for registration.250 Under this view,
securities sold in a deference offering should not count against the baseline
exemption amount.
On the other hand, the economic rationale for the deference exemptions
does not preclude marginal benefits from registration with the SEC.
Registration with the SEC might produce benefits even when an alternative
regulator is already providing some investor protection. The larger the
offering, the greater the likelihood that this incremental benefit of registration
exceeds the cost of registration. In that case, sales pursuant to deference
exemptions should be assigned a fractional weight just like the small offering
exemptions.
VI. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE WEIGHTED EXEMPTION APPROACH
Three features of the various transaction exemptions-solicitation restric-
tions, resale restrictions, and limits on the number of purchasers-require
special examination. Resale restrictions and limits on the number of
247 If the marginal benefit exceeded the marginal cost, then at some offering amount, the total benefit of
registration would exceed the total cost, and registration should be required.
248 See Bradford, supra note 12, at 658-64.
249 See supra Part H.C.
250 If anything, the existence of a deference (or sophisticated offeree) offering could reduce the benefit of
registration to the other investors. The alternative regulator (or the sophisticated offerees) could force the
issuer to produce additional information, and that additional information could spill over to the other investors.
Furthermore, if the securities in the two offerings are similar and sold on similar terms, any fairness review the
alternative regulator does would benefit the other investors as well.
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purchasers can be incorporated into the proposed weighted exemption system
without seriously affecting either the policies served by those restrictions or the
utility of the weighted exemption system itself. However, restrictions on
solicitation present a more serious challenge. If the solicitation restrictions are
maintained, the weighted exemption system loses some, but not all, of its
usefulness. The choice is between some liberalization of the general solicita-
tion restrictions or a less helpful weighted exemption system retaining vestiges
of the transactional approach.
A. Restrictions on Solicitation
Some of the exemptions restrict solicitation of investors. General
solicitation and advertising are prohibited in most Regulation D offerings,251
and Regulation A limits pre-filing solicitation 2 as well as post-filing written
solicitation and advertising. 3 Rule 147 and sections 3(a)(11) and 4(2) of the
Securities Act also effectively limit solicitation and advertising by requiring
that all offerees, not just purchasers, fall within the limits of the exemption.2
Allowing an issuer to use multiple exemptions in combination for a single
offering introduces a new wrinkle into the restrictions on solicitation. What
happens when an issuer may sell pursuant to several exemptions, some of
which restrict solicitation and some of which do not? Solicitation and
advertising are not easily confined within a single exemption; they have
spillover effects.
Assume, for example, that an issuer is using both Regulation A and Rule
505 of Regulation D in combination for a single offering. To generate interest
in the offering, the issuer publishes a written test-the-waters advertisement of
the type allowed by Regulation A.255 That advertisement is inconsistent with
the Rule 502(c) prohibition of general solicitation and general advertising.256
Some of the Regulation D purchasers may have seen the advertisement;
indeed, they may have been attracted to the issuer because of the
advertisement. Does the Regulation A solicitation impermissibly taint the
251 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1999).
252 Id. §§ 230.251(d)(1)(i), 230.254.
253 Il § 230.251(d)(ii),(iii).
254 Id. § 230.147(d); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(11), 77d(2) (1994).
25 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (1999) (allowing the issuer to determine whether there is any interest in a possible
securities offering).
216 Id. § 230.502(c).
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Regulation D portion of the offering and make it impossible to use the two
exemptions together?
25 7
If the answer to this question is yes, then the weighted exemption proposal
loses some of its utility. Issuers would have to comply with the most
restrictive limits on solicitation for the entire offering.25 If the answer to this
question is no, then an issuer could indirectly circumvent the solicitation
restrictions in one exemption by soliciting pursuant to another exemption, and
using the solicitation to generate interest in the offering as a whole.
If the restrictions on solicitation and the associated focus on offerees rather
than purchasers were eliminated, this predicament would disappear. Such a
move probably makes sense,259 and, for a while, federal securities law seemed
to be moving in that direction. In 1992, the SEC modified Regulation A's ban
on pre-filing offers to allow issuers to "test the waters," and freed all Rule 504260
offerings from the general solicitation ban. In 1995, the SEC proposed to
extend the test-the waters idea to registered initial public offerings. At the
same time, the SEC requested comment on whether the prohibition against
general solicitation in Regulation D (then applicable only to Rule 505 and 506
offerings) should be revised or eliminated. And, in 1998, the SEC's Aircraft
Carrier proposal suggested eliminating restrictions on offers for larger
reporting companies and significantly relaxing those restrictions for other• 263
companies making registered public offerings. However, in 1999, the SEC
reimposed the general solicitation/general advertising ban on Rule 504
257 A similar problem arises in dealing with the exemptions that focus on offerees rather than on actual
purchasers. Rule 147, for example, says that offers may be made only to persons resident in the state or
territory in which the issuer resides. l § 230.147(d). If an issuer makes an offering under Rule 147 at the
same time as, for example, a Rule 504 offering, do the out-of-state offerees in the Rule 504 portion of the
offering contaminate the Rule 147 portion of the offering?
258 A weighted exemption system would still have some value to issuers because they could still combine
other aspects of the exemptions in a single offering, as long as they limited their solicitation.
259 See Campbell, supra note 14, at 136-43 (urging elimination of the Regulation D general solicitation
ban); Stuart R. Cohn, Securities Marketsfor Small Issuers: The Barrier of Federal Solicitation andAdvertising
Prohibitions, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 25-32 (1986) (urging that the restrictions on solicitation be loosened);
Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38 EMORY L2. 67, 126-29 (1989) (urging
elimination of the Regulation D general solicitation ban).
260 Small Business Initiatives, supra note 64, at 36,444-5.
261 Solicitations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering, Securities Act Release No. 7188, 60 Fed.
Reg. 35,648 (1995). See generally Jeffrey A. Brill, "Testing the Waters"-The SEC'S Feet Go from Wet to
Cold, 83 CORNELL. REV. 464 (1998).
262 Exemption for Certain California Limited Issues, supra note 246, at 35,641.
263 Aircraft Carrier, supra note 5, at 67,210-16.
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offerings, with some exceptions. 264  The test-the-waters idea for registered
offerings has apparently been subsumed by the Aircraft Carrier, the SEC
deferred action on (and probably implicitly rejected) the idea of eliminating the
general solicitation ban from Regulation D, 26  and it remains to be seen
whether any aircraft will ever fly from the Aircraft Carrier.2  Thus, at this
point, the prospect of eliminating the general solicitation restrictions is
uncertain at best.
A possible solution to the solicitation problem is some sort of tracing
requirement that would attempt to determine what types of solicitation each
purchaser has been exposed to and limit that purchaser to an exemption that
allows such a solicitation. For example, a person who saw a Regulation A test-
the-waters advertisement could not be part of the Regulation D portion of an
offering. However, it would be prohibitively expensive or even impossible to
trace the solicitations to which a potential purchaser has been exposed,
especially given the possibility of indirect exposure.267 Thus, tracing is not a
realistic alternative.
B. Restrictions on Resale
Some of the exemptions, such as Regulation D and Rule 147, restrict
268
resales. Others, such as Regulation A, do not; purchasers in a Regulation A
offering may freely resell the securities they purchase.269 If an offering is sold
pursuant to more than one exemption, some of the securities will be freely
tradable while others will be subject to resale restrictions.
Unlike the general solicitation issue, the resale problem is neither novel nor
inextricable. Under the existing system, an issuer may have outstanding
identical securities, some of which are restricted and some of which are not.
For example, if an issuer sells common stock in a registered public offering
264 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1) (1999); Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital"
Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 7644,64 Fed. Reg. 11,090 (1999) (proposed March, 8, 1999).
265 Exemption for Certain California Limited Issues, supra note 246, at 35,641 (deferring action on the
proposal). The subsequent decision to extend the general solicitation prohibition to Rule 504 offerings hardly
seems consistent with the general elimination of the requirement from Regulation D.
266 See SEC Commissioner Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Speech, Aircraft Carrier- The Commission Comes to a Fork
in the Ocean (Nov. 5, 1998), available at <http:llwww.sec.govlnewslspeecheslspch224.htm> (visited June 23,
1999) (SEC Commissioner expressing doubts about the proposals in the Aircraft Carrier).
267 For example, Smith sees a test-the-waters advertisement and suggests that her friend Jones check out
the company. The issuer then sells to Jones in the Regulation D portion of the offering.
261 See supra Part lIl.A.1.
269 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.263 (1999).
20001
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
and, a year later, sells the same class of stock in a Rule 506 private offering,
the registered stock may be freely resold, but the Rule 506 stock is subject to
the resale restrictions in Rule 144. Because of the special resale restrictions
applicable to an issuer's affiliates, it also is possible for resale restrictions on
securities to vary even when those securities are sold simultaneously in the
same offering. Non-affiliates who purchase securities in a Regulation A
offering or a registered offering may freely resell those securities while
affiliates who purchase in the same offering may not.
270
As implied above, the problem of a single class of security being
simultaneously restricted and not restricted is currently solved through tracing.
Non-afiliates who purchase stock in a registered offering may resell; 27 non-
affiliates who purchase the same stock in a Rule 506 offering may not. z27 The
tracing solution would work equally well when multiple exemptions are used
for a single offering. For example, purchasers who buy in the Regulation A
part of the offering may freely resell, but those who purchase in the Regulation
D part of the offering may not. Although such tracing is not always easy, the
problem is no greater in a weighted exemption system than it is in the current
system. Thus, varying resale restrictions are not a major obstacle to the
adoption of my proposal.
C. Limits on the Number of Purchasers
Rules 505 and 506 limit the number of purchasers to whom an issuer may
sell.2 73 None of the other exemptions limit the number of purchasers. The
policy justification for the Rule 505 and 506 limits is unclear.2 74  But,
assuming those purchaser limits are retained, how should they be applied if an
issuer combines a Rule 505 or 506 exemption with some other exemption in
the same offering? Should the entire offering be limited to thirty-five
purchasers, should only the Rule 505 or 506 portion of the offering be limited
to thirty-five purchasers, or should the thirty-five-purchaser limit be adjusted
pro rata in proportion to the size of the Rule 505-506 portion of the offering?
When applying Rule 505 or 506 to a portion of the offering, one option is
to limit the entire offering, including the portion sold pursuant to other
270 See supra Part III.A.1.
271 Campbell, supra note 116, at 1349-50.
272 17 C.F.R. 230.502(d).
273 Id. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), 230.506(b)(2)(i) (1999). Certain purchasers, including all accredited
investors, are excluded from the 35 purchaser limit. See id. § 230.501(e)(1).
274 See Bradford, supra note 12, at 635-39.
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exemptions, to a total of thirty-five purchasers. This option, however, is
inconsistent with the whole concept of the weighted exemption proposal. The
dollar amount available for each exemption is calculated based on the amount
of investor protection provided by its requirements, and that includes the
purchaser limits.275 No additional limitations beyond those provided in the
particular exemption are needed. Furthermore, unlike the case of restrictions
on solicitation, there are no spillover effects associated with this option. Not
applying the purchaser limit to other parts of the offering does not in any way
allow the issuer to circumvent the limits in Rules 505 and 506. Any sales
pursuant to the restrictions in those exemptions will still be subject to the
thirty-five purchaser limit.
If it does not make sense to apply the purchaser limit to the entire offering,
should the thirty-five purchaser limit at least be reduced proportionately? The
thirty-five purchaser limit is calculated on the basis of an entire $5 million
offering. If the Rule 505 or 506 sales are for less than $5 million and are only
a portion of the offering, it seems sensible to adjust the thirty-five purchaser
limit proportionately to account for this. For example, if the Rule 505 portion
of the offering is only for $1 million, one-fifth of the total dollar amount, the
purchaser limit should only be seven, one-fifth of the total purchaser limit.
This argument seems plausible on its face, but it is inconsistent with the
current structure of Rules 505 and 506. An issuer may make a Rule 505 or 506
offering to thirty-five purchasers, whether the offering amount is $500,000, $1
million, $5 million, or, in the case of Rule 506, an unlimited amount.
Whatever the purpose of the thirty-five purchaser limit, that purpose does not
seem to depend on the size of the offering. Thus, the best solution is to
continue to apply the full thirty-five purchaser limit, but only to the Rule 505
or 506 portions of the offering.
276
CONCLUSION
It is time to free the Securities Act registration exemptions from their
transactional underpinnings. The integration doctrine and the complex system
of metaphysics, safe harbors, and informal interpretations that keep the system
(barely) alive should be abolished, and replaced with the weighted exemption
system proposed in this Article. A weighted exemption system would fulfill
275 See supra Part V.A.
276 Since Rule 506 has no maximum dollar amount, it is difficult to see how its 35 purchaser limit could
be proportionately adjusted to the dollar amount of the offering in any case.
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all of the goals of the current system at a substantially lower cost to issuers, the
SEC, and the investing public.
